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INTRODUCTION
In federal appellate practice, the standard of review is the name of the
game. It is often "outcome determinative," in the sense that the difference
between victory and defeat on appeal can turn on whether the standard by
which the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision on an issue is
plenary or deferential.' Indeed, so important to the appellate process is the
standard of review that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require a
statement of the standard of review in all parties' briefs.2
I Associate Professor, University of Washington School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Terry Briscoe, Tatyana Gidirimski, Chester Gilmore, and Megan Decker Walseth for
valuable research assistance. The author also wishes to acknowledge the Supreme
Court's decision in Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 235 (1991), as inspiration
for this Article's title. In Salve Regina, the respondent claimed "this is simply de novo
review 'cloth[ed] in 'deferential' robes."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for
Respondent at 15, Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991) (No. 89-1629)).
1. See Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1204-05 (3d Cir. 1993); Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 693 F.2d
477, 480 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1982).
2. See FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(B), 28(b)(5).
Syracuse Law Review
Traditionally, decisions by trial judges have been divided into three
categories for purposes of appellate of review: questions of law, reviewable
"de novo"; questions of fact, reviewable for "clear error"; and matters of
discretion, reviewable for "abuse of discretion."3
The first category, "de novo review[,] is review without deference," or
review that is "independent and plenary. ''4 Under de novo review, the
appellate court will thus "look at the matter anew, as though it had come to
the courts for the first time."5
The other two categories involve different degrees of deference to the
trial court, with abuse of discretion usually thought to be the more
deferential of the two.6 A finding of fact is said to be "'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed."7 Under clear error review, the appellate court cannot
reverse the trial court's determination merely because it would have found
the facts differently had it been sitting as the trier of fact: "[w]here there are
two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between
them cannot be clearly erroneous." 8
A district court vested with discretion on a matter "is not required by
law to make a particular decision .... [but instead] is empowered to make
a decision-of its choosing-that falls within a range of permissible
decisions."9 Sometimes, the trial court's exercise of its discretion is based
on a weighing of factors, in which case an abuse of discretion will be found
3. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988); see also Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 695 n.3 (1996) (indicating that clear error review is the standard under which
appellate courts review a trial court's factual findings).
4. Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2001).
5. Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the term as
"[a]new; afresh; a second time.").
6. See Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 916-17 (7th Cir. 1991).
The court stated:
Abuse of discretion is conventionally regarded as a more deferential standard than
clear error, though whether there is any real or consistent difference has been
questioned. The alternative view is that both standards denote a range rather than
a point, that the ranges overlap and maybe coincide, and that the actual degree of
scrutiny in a particular case depends on the particulars of that case rather than on
the label affixed to the standard of appellate review.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
7. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
8. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
9. Zervos, 252 F.3d at 168-69; accord Grant v. City of Long Beach, 315 F.3d 1081,
1091 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The abuse of discretion standard requires us to uphold a district court
determination that falls within a broad range of permissible conclusions in the absence of an
erroneous application of law.").
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only if the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors, considered
improper factors, or made a "'clear error of judgment"' in weighing the
correct factors.'° The appellate court cannot under this standard of review
merely substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court." In general,
an abuse of discretion will be found only if the trial court's decision is
"arbitrary," "irrational," "capricious," "whimsical," "fanciful," or
"unreasonable."' 2 Furthermore, the trial court's exercise of its discretion
will not be disturbed unless it can be said that "'no reasonable person
would adopt the district court's view."" 3
The rationales for exercising different standards of review for
questions of fact and law and for exercises of discretion turn on, inter alia,
the relative expertise and institutional structure of trial and appellate courts,
the nature of the questions involved, and public policy.' 4 Thus, questions
of law are reviewed de novo because an appellate court has more time for
research and consideration of such issues than does a trial court, which
must preside over "fast-paced trials," and also because appellate courts sit
in multi-judge panels, permitting "reflective dialogue and collective
judgment."' 5 Findings of fact by a trial court are reviewed with deference
10. United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Super Sulky,
Inc. v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 174 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1999)); accord United
States v. Marshall, 307 F.3d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Evidentiary rulings are reviewed
pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard, considering the whole record and reversing only
if there is a firm and definite belief that the trial court made a clear error in judgment.");
Unites States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1984) ("To determine whether the
District Court abused its discretion, this Court must consider whether the decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.").
11. See, e.g., United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir. 1995).
12. Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1994); Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002); Unites States v. Achiekwelu, 112 F.3d 747,
753 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Stroud, 62 Fed. Appx. 886, 888 (10th Cir. 2003).
13. Stecyk, 295 F.3d at 412 (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d
Cir. 2000)).
14. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-33 (1991) ("Those
circumstances in which Congress or this Court has articulated a standard of deference for
appellate review of district court determinations reflect an accommodation of the respective
institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts."). Id. at 233.
15. Id. The Court stated:
Independent appellate review of legal issues best serves the dual goals of
doctrinal coherence and economy of judicial administration. District judges
preside alone over fast-paced trials: Of necessity they devote much of their energy
and resources to hearing witnesses and reviewing evidence. Similarly, the
logistical burdens of trial advocacy limit the extent to which trial counsel is able
to supplement the district judge's legal research with memoranda and briefs.
Thus, trial judges often must resolve complicated legal questions without benefit
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because the trial judge is believed to have greater expertise in finding facts,
has the ability to observe the testimony of witnesses live (and is thus better
able to judge demeanor than an appellate court reviewing a cold record),
and because allowing for plenary review of facts at the appellate level is
thought to be a tremendous waste of private and judicial resources. 6 The
rationale for limiting review of a particular issue to abuse of discretion is a
determination that the trial court is better positioned than the appeals court
to decide the issue because it involves "'multifarious, fleeting, special,
narrow facts that utterly resist generalization.""' 7
So what standard of review applies when a trial court is said to have
erred in admitting or excluding an item of evidence? Does a decision to
admit or exclude evidence in applying the Federal Rules of Evidence
involve a question of law, a question of fact, an exercise of discretion, or a
combination of all of these?
In every federal circuit, one can find a panel decision stating in
general terms that a decision to admit or exclude evidence by the trial court
is reviewed only for "abuse of discretion," suggesting that the application
of the Federal Rules of Evidence is committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. 8 Does this mean, then, that trial courts have broad
of "extended reflection [or] extensive information."
Courts of appeals, on the other hand, are structurally suited to the
collaborative juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy. With the record
having been constructed below and settled for purposes of the appeal, appellate
judges are able to devote their primary attention to legal issues. As questions of
law become the focus of appellate review, it can be expected that the parties'
briefs will be refined to bring to bear on the legal issues more information and
more comprehensive analysis than was provided for the district judge. Perhaps
most important, courts of appeals employ multijudge panels that permit reflective
dialogue and collective judgment.
Id. at 231-32 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer:
A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73
MiNN. L. REv. 899, 923 (1989)).
16. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75.
17. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996) (review of trial court's decision to
depart from sentencing guidelines) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 404) (1990)); Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404 (review of trial court's imposition of
Rule 11 sanctions) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561-62).
18. United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152, 160 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Our standard of
review of a district court's admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion.");
Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 163 (2d Cir. 2001) ("'Decisions to admit or
exclude evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion .... ' (quoting United States v. Han,
230 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2000))); United States v. Woods, 321 F.3d 361, 363 (3d Cir.
2003) ("We review the District Court's evidence ruling for abuse of discretion."); United
States v. Hayes, 322 F.3d 792, 799 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Decisions allowing the introduction of
evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion."); United States v. Wilson, 322 F.3d 353, 359
(5th Cir. 2003) ("We review a district court's admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse
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discretion in how they interpret the rules of evidence, such as the
determination whether the hearsay exception for statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment covers statements made to psychologists, 9
or whether a federal physician-patient testimonial privilege exists? 2 Either
these appellate panels cannot mean what they say, or "abuse of discretion"
review means something different than has been traditionally understood,
or the traditional tripartite standard of review (and the policies underlying
it) has been thrown out the window when it comes to review of decisions
admitting or excluding evidence.
A review of the cases demonstrates that the traditional tripartite
standard of review is alive and well when it comes to reviewing evidentiary
errors. Only the First Circuit explicitly delineates the tripartite standard of
review in this context.2 ' Yet many circuits, such as the Second Circuit,
have re-defined "abuse of discretion" review in this context as
incorporating a combination of de novo, clear error, and traditional abuse
of discretion review, holding that
A district court "abuses" or "exceeds" the discretion accorded to
of discretion."); Argentine v. United Steelworkers of Am., 287 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir.
2002) ("Generally, we review a district court's evidentiary decisions for abuse of
discretion... "); United States v. Van Dreel, 155 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1998) ("We
review a district court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion."); United States
v. Munoz, 324 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2003) ("We review the district court's decision to
admit evidence for abuse of discretion."); United States v. Beckman, 298 F.3d 788, 792 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("We review the admission or exclusion of evidence under the familiar abuse of
discretion standard."); Christansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1283 (10th Cir. 2003)
("We review a district court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of
discretion."); Chrysler Int'l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (11 th Cir. 2002) ("A
ruling admitting or excluding evidence is only reviewed for abuse of discretion."); United
States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("'This court reviews a trial
judge's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion."' (quoting United States v. Smart, 98
F.3d 1379, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1996))). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
applies the same standard of review as would the regional court that normally hears appeals
from the district that decided the case before the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Atmel Corp. v.
Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., 76 Fed. Appx. 298, 312 (Fed:Cir. 2003).
19. See FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
20. See FED. R. EvID. 501.
21. Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 251-52 (1st Cir. 1998). The
court stated:
It is commonly said that a trial judge's decision regarding the admissibility
of expert testimony will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. This
formulation is adequate to our case which involves judgments of balancing and
degree as to relevance, prejudice and the like. It is useful to note, however, that
admissibility of evidence issues can also turn on abstract questions of law, where
review is de novo, or on findings by the judge of specific facts, where review is
for clear error.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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it when (1) its decision rests on an error of law.., or a clearly
erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision-though not
necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous
factual finding-cannot be located within the range of permissible
decisions.22
Many other decisions state in the context of reviewing claims of
evidentiary error that an abuse of discretion occurs when the district court
"bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous
assessment of the facts," 23 while several others hold that while "[r]ulings on
the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion, 24 a
district court 'by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of
law,"' with review of that error of law being de novo.25
Sometimes, a court recites in almost rote fashion that it reviews claims
of evidentiary error for "abuse of discretion," but it is clear in context that
they are reviewing those claims of evidentiary error that involve potential
errors of law de novo, as evidenced by their bare assertions throughout the
opinion of what the correct interpretation of a rule of evidence is, without
any deference being given to the trial court's determination of that question
of law, and with deference only coming into play when the appellate court
22. Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Zervos,
252 F.3d at 168-69); see also United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 559 (10th Cir. 2002).
In Jenkins, the court stated:
We review questions concerning the admission of evidence under an abuse of
discretion standard. Under that standard, we will not disturb an evidentiary ruling
absent a distinct showing that it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact
or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error in judgment.
Id.; accord Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1998). The court in Collins v.
Kibort stated:
Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, a reversal is warranted "only
when the trial judge's 'decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or
where the record contains no evidence on which he rationally could have based
that decision, or where the supposed facts found are clearly erroneous."'
Collins, 143 F.3d at 336-37 (quoting Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 1992);
Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563-64 (7th Cir. 1984)).
23. United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1410 (9th Cir. 1993); accord Cardinal
Fastener & Specialty Co. v. Progress Bank, 67 Fed. Appx. 343, 345-46 (6th Cir. 2003)
("'An abuse of discretion exists when the district court applies the wrong legal standard,
misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact."'
(quoting First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 1993)));
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999); Palmquist v. Selvik,
111 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir. 1997).
24. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 556 (1 1th Cir. 1998);
accord United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 497 (4th Cir. 2003) ("'[A] district
court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law."' (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 896 (4th Cir. 2001))).
25. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d at 556 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 100).
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discusses the trial court's application of the rule (assuming the trial court
interpreted the rule correctly) to a given fact scenario.26 Throughout this
article, I rely on such cases-whose introductory language suggests a
deferential standard of review, but whose application and reasoning
suggests a de novo standard of review-to support my claim that certain
types of evidentiary errors are reviewed de novo.27
Under this "peculiar lexicon," there are thus three prongs to this new
"abuse of discretion" review that mirror the traditional tripartite law-fact-
discretion standard of review. 28  A claim that the trial court erred in
admitting or excluding evidence based on an erroneous interpretation of a
rule of evidence is reviewed under the de novo prong of the "abuse of
discretion" standard. A claim that the trial court erred in admitting or
excluding evidence based on an erroneous factual finding is reviewed
under the clear error prong of the "abuse of discretion" standard. And a
claim that the trial court erred in admitting or excluding evidence in
exercising its discretionary authority is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion prong of the "abuse of discretion" standard.
Why on earth, one might ask, would the appellate courts replace the
traditional tripartite standard of review in this context with "abuse of
discretion" review, only to re-define "abuse of discretion" review as wholly
encompassing the traditional tripartite standard of review? Part of the story
appears to be a misreading of the Supreme Court's decision in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, in which the Supreme Court held that the trial
court's determination of the reliability of expert witness testimony is
subject only to review for abuse of discretion. 29  In Joiner, there is a
sentence that reads "[a]ll evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard."30 In context, it seems clear that this sentence
refers to an argument attributed to one of the parties before the Court.3"
Yet, it has been misinterpreted as being part of its holding by some
appellate courts, thus causing them to feel bound to review all claims of
evidentiary error under an abuse of discretion standard.32 At the same time,
26. E.g., United States v. Guevara, 277 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2001); Huffman v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1481-83 (10th Cir. 1990).
27. When such cases are invoked, they will have a parenthetical so indicating to avoid
confusion.
28. United States v. Brown, No. 97-1618, 2000 WL 876382, at *9 (6th Cir. June 20,
2000).
29. Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
30. Id. at 141.
31. See id.
32. Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 716-17 (6th Cir. 1999). The court
noted that in Joiner, "the Court was not dealing with an alleged hearsay rule violation, but
2004] 537
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these appellate courts remain wed to the policies that underlie the
traditional tripartite standard of review, and thus find it hard to believe that
th6 Supreme Court would mean that a trial court has "discretion" over how
to construe the text of a rule of evidence.33 They thus resolve their
dilemma by re-interpreting the "abuse of discretion" standard to include de
novo review of errors of law, with such errors deemed to be an "abuse of
discretion.-34  This solution is not altogether without precedent, for the
Unites States Supreme Court itself, in another context, has held that the
proper standard of review is "abuse of discretion," but then went on to
incorporate de novo review of legal determinations underlying the exercise
of that discretion into the standard.
35
A second reason may have to do with the ubiquitous nature of Rule
403 in evidence practice. That rule provides that evidence, even if relevant,
can be excluded by the trial judge "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 36 It is clear that Rule 403
determinations are reviewed only for abuse of discretion in its classical
sense.37 It is also clear that Rule 403 applies to virtually any evidence,
its sweeping 'all evidentiary ruling' statement rather clearly means what it says." Id. at 716.
33. See id. at 716-17; Brown, 2000 WL 876382, at *9.
34. Brown, 2000 WL 876382, at *9. The court stated:
[A] trial court has no "discretion" to disregard the explicit foundational
requirements of the hearsay rule as codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence ....
When a federal court admits or rejects evidence in violation of the requirements
of these rules, it errs as a matter of law .... But in the peculiar lexicon of our
precedentially binding federal evidence jurisprudence, an evidentiary error of law
has been held to be an "abuse of discretion"; that, and our obedience to the
Supreme Court's command in Joiner, are the only explanations we can offer for
analyzing the district court's rulings ... using an abuse of discretion standard.
Id.
35. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 100. The court stated:
Little turns, however, on whether we label review of this particular question abuse
of discretion or de novo, for an abuse-of-discretion standard does not mean a
mistake of law is beyond appellate correction. A district court by definition
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. That a departure decision, in
an occasional case, may call for a legal determination does not mean, as a
consequence, that parts of the review must be labeled de novo while other parts
are labeled an abuse of discretion. The abuse-of-discretion standard includes
review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal
conclusions.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402-403, 405).
36. FED. R. EVID. 403.
37. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 & n.7 (1997); United States v. Abel,
469 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1984). Where trial court fails to make explicit findings, the appeals
court has discretion to consider the issue de novo. United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175
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even if the evidence satisfies the hearsay rule, the best evidence rule, and
every other rule of evidence. 38 Thus, because the Rule 403 ground is often
raised in tandem with every other objection, because the Rule 403 decision
is reviewed only for abuse of discretion in its classical sense, and because,
when a trial court excludes evidence, only one of its grounds for excluding
the evidence need be correct for an appellate court to affirm its exclusion of
the evidence,39 in effect the evidentiary ruling in such instances is
ultimately reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
Although the labels have thus changed, the name of the appellate
game is still the same. For any given type of error in admitting or
excluding evidence, one needs to determine whether review is discretionary
or deferential. The purpose of the remainder of this Article is to parse each
of the rules of evidence to determine which types of claimed errors are
entitled to de novo review, which are entitled to clear error review, and
which are entitled to traditional abuse of discretion review. By "type" of
error, this Article does not mean to refer to such large categories as
"hearsay," "best evidence," "relevance," "privilege," or the like. Rather,
this Article will demonstrate that within each of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, different types of error can be made, some subject to de novo
review and others subject to clear error or abuse of discretion review. It is
the goal of this Article to provide a roadmap for both courts and
practitioners to determine the appropriate standard of review for any
potential evidentiary error that may arise during the course of a trial under
the reincarnated tripartite standard of review.
A few qualifications are in order before proceeding. The first is that
the analysis in this Article presumes that an appropriate objection or offer
of proof has been made in the trial court, as required by Rule 103(a).40 If
F.3d 838, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1999).
38. See infra notes 86, 108, 118, 126, 143, 419 and accompanying text.
39. Schafer v. Time, Inc., 142 F.3d 1361, 1373 n.20 (11th Cir. 1998); McAlinney v.
Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 992 F.2d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 1993); Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of N.Y., 6 F.3d 367, 385-86 (6th Cir. 1993).
40. FED. R. EVID. 103(a). Rule 103(a) states:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless...
(1)... In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific
ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2)... In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked.
5392004]
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not, review is at best4' for plain error,42 a very difficult standard to
overcome43 that requires a showing that the error is not only obvious, but
also prejudicial in that it must have affected the outcome of the trial court
proceedings.' The second qualification is to point out that, even assuming
that review is de novo, and that the appellate court finds that the trial court
has erred, this does not guarantee reversal. Rule 103(a) also requires that
the trial court's ruling affected "a substantial right of the party,"'45 a
codification of the so-called "harmless error doctrine, 46 which allows for
reversal only if it is determined that the jury's judgment was affected by the
error.4 7 Yet assuming the error was properly preserved for appeal and
cannot be deemed harmless, the distinctions that follow are critical in that
they can literally make or break an appeal, making a thorough
understanding of them crucial to practitioners and judges alike.
I. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Rule 402 provides that "relevant evidence" is presumptively
admissible, while evidence that is "not relevant" is inadmissible.48 The
phrase "relevant evidence" is defined in Rule 401 as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." '49 This definition can be thought of as consisting of
two prongs, a materiality prong and a probative worth prong, both of which
41. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-36 (1993). Plain error review is
discretionary, with that discretion to be exercised if the error "'seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."' Id. (quoting United States
v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
42. See FED. R. EVID. 103(d) ("Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.").
43. United States v. Swatzie, 228 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2000); Unites States v.
Simone, 931 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1991).
44. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-36.
45. FED. R. EvID. 103(a) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected ....").
46. Mason v. Southern Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (7th Cir.
2000); United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 1991).
47. Costantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164, 174 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Perry v. Ethan
Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 1997)); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 547
(5th Cir. 1996); Tr. of Univ. of Pa. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 890, 906 (3d Cir. 1987).
48. FED. R. EvID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.").
49. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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must be satisfied for a piece of evidence to be deemed "relevant."5 ° The
materiality prong is encompassed by the language in the rule referring to
"any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action," which
requires looking to the underlying substantive claim or offense to
determine its elements and any defenses.5 The probative worth prong sets
an extremely low standard, requiring that the evidence only have "any
tendency" to make the existence of a material fact "more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." 52 Even if evidence is
"relevant," however, Rule 403 calls for its exclusion "if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."53
The United States Supreme Court has held that review of the trial
court's balancing of probative worth and prejudicial effect under Rule 403
is reviewed only for abuse of discretion,5 4 largely because the exercise of
balancing these against one another involves consideration of multiple
factors55 and is a highly fact-sensitive undertaking. 56 With respect to the
determination whether evidence is "relevant" under Rules 401 and 402,
some appellate decisions hold that review is de novo,57 while others suggest
that review is deferential. 8 However, many of the cases holding that
50. Although the text of the rule no longer uses the common law term "materiality,"
FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note, the phrase is nonetheless convenient in
distinguishing between the two different aspects of relevancy under the federal rules. See,
e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES:
TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 62 (4th ed. 2000); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 383-41
(John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992).
51. FED. R. EvID. 401; JACK WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
401.04[3][b], at 401-33 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002); CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.2, at 228-29 (2d ed. 1999).
52. FED. R. EVID. 401; WEINSTEIN, supra note 51, § 401.04[2][c][i], at 401-22.1;
MUELLER & KRKPATRICK, supra note 51, § 4.2, at 170-71.
53. FED. R. EVID. 403.
54. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 & n.7 (1997); United States v. Abel,
469 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1984). If the trial court fails to make explicit findings, the appeals court
has discretion to consider the issue de novo. United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d
838, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1999).
55. United States v. Imran, 964 F.2d 1313, 1316 (2d Cir. 1992); Kelsay v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 749 F.2d 437, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lebovitz,
669 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1982).
56. See Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury, Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2001).
57. United States v. Vargas-Sandoval, No. 94-50260, 1994 WL 651930, at *1 (9th Cir.
Nov. 18, 1994); United States v. Thompson, 37 F.3d 450, 452 (9th Cir. 1994); Bruno v.
W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 1989).
58. United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1120 (1 lth Cir. 2002); Dufly v. Wolle,
123 F.3d 1026, 1039 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir.
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review of the relevancy issue is deferential appear to be conflating the
relevancy issue with the Rule 403 issue.59 Such conflation may be
appropriate when the dispute involves the probative worth prong of the
relevancy determination, as that determination is so closely tied to the Rule
403 balancing that parsing out the two issues and reviewing them under
different standards may be infeasible as a practical matter. Yet when the
dispute involves the materiality prong of the relevancy determination, the
underlying substantive law governing the dispute is implicated, and the
analysis of that issue is unrelated to Rule 403 balancing, making de novo
review appropriate.60
In conducting the Rule 403 balancing, the official commentary to the
federal rules counsels that courts should consider the efficacy of giving a
limited instruction in lieu of excluding the evidence altogether.6' Rule 105
provides that "[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly." 62  If a request for such an
instruction is made and the trial court decides to admit the evidence at
issue, it must give a limiting instruction and has no discretion to do
otherwise (with a failure to do so thus being an error of law subject to de
novo review), 63 although the form of such an instruction is reviewed only
for abuse of discretion,' including the timing of when it is given. 65 If no
1995); United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 1989).
59. United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1339 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Stull,
743 F.2d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bouye, 688 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir.
1982).
60. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. O'Connor, 32 Fed. Appx. 821, 824 (9th Cir.
2002); Richardson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999); Shade v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 154 F.3d 143, 151-55 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Moreno, 102 F.3d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1996).
61. See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note ("In reaching a decision whether
to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction."); FED. R. EvID. 105 advisory
committee's note. The advisory committee's note for Rule 105 stated:
A close relationship exists between this rule and Rule 403 .... The present rule
recognizes the practice of admitting evidence for a limited purpose and instructing
the jury accordingly. The availability and effectiveness of this practice must be
taken into consideration in reaching a decision whether to exclude for unfair
prejudice under Rule 403.
FED. R. EVID. 105 advisory committee's note.
62. FED. R. EVID. 105.
63. United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 1991); Lubbock Feed Lots,
Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250, 266 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. See United States v. Restreop, 884 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1989); Hale v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 820 F.2d 928, 935 (8th Cir. 1987).
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request is made for such an instruction, the decision to give one when
admitting such evidence is left to the discretion of the trial court.66 While
normally the decision to use a Rule 105 limiting instruction in lieu of
exclusion of the evidence is reviewed, as with other Rule 403
determinations, only for abuse of discretion,67 where the admission of such
evidence implicates a criminal defendant's Confrontation Clause rights,
review is de novo.68
Sometimes, the risk of prejudice to a party may arise because only a
portion of a written or recorded statement is introduced to the jury. The so-
called "rule of completeness, 69 codified in Rule 106, is designed to deal
with this problem, and provides that "[w]hen a writing or recorded
statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may
require the introduction at that time of any other part of any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it."'70  Appellate courts review de novo the
interpretation of the scope of the rule, such as whether it allows for the
admission of those parts of a writing or recording that would otherwise be
inadmissible (because, for example, they are hearsay not within any
exception), 7' or whether the rule is applicable to oral statements.72
However, the trial court's decision as to what portions of a writing or
recording "ought in fairness" be introduced is a judgment call reviewed
only for abuse of discretion on appeal.73
While Rule 403 is written in general terms to cover any situation,
certain types of evidence are offered with sufficient regularity so as to
merit treatment with rules more specific and definitive than Rule 403,
which are set forth in Rules 404 through 415. 74
65. See Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1426 (4th Cir. 1985).
66. United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 500 (2d Cir. 1984).
67. See United States v. Wright, 943 F.2d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 1991).
68. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124-26 (1968).
69. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee's note.
70. FED. R. EvID. 106.
71. United States v. Guevara, 277 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696
(4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1987).
72. Collicott, 92 F.3d at 983 & n.12; United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696 (2d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258-59 (7th Cir. 1993).
73. United States v. Millan, 230 F.3d 431, 434-35 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v.
Glover, 101 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th Cir. 1996).
74. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note ("[S]ome situations recur with
sufficient frequency to create patterns susceptible of treatment by specific rules. Rule 404
and those following it are of that variety; they also serve as illustrations of the application of
the present rule as limited by the exclusionary principles of Rule 403.").
2004]
Syracuse Law Review
Rule 404(a) provides that, subject to specified exceptions, "[e]vidence
of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion."7 5 The exceptions include "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused"76 and "evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the alleged victim."77 The determination whether a given trait
is "pertinent"-like the determination whether evidence is "material"-
implicates the underlying substantive law, and is thus reviewed de novo.7 8
Rule 404(b), while reiterating that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith,"79 provides that such evidence may "be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."80 For Rule 404(b) evidence to be used for "other purposes," it is
only necessary that the trial court determine that there are sufficient facts to
support a finding by the jury that the "other crimes, wrongs, or acts"
occurred,8 a factual determination by the trial court reviewed on appeal
only for clear error.82 Most courts hold that whether evidence falls within
the scope of rule 404(b) is a question of law reviewed de novo.83 While
some decisions hold that this determination is reviewed deferentially, many
of these decisions appear to be mixing the standard of review on the Rule
404(b) question with that for Rule 403 balancing.84 In effect, this is the
same sort of practical conflation discussed above with respect to Rules 401
and 403: Rule 404(b) sets forth certain types of uses of evidence of prior
wrongs which are permissible, and a determination must be made whether
the proffered evidence is relevant for any of those purposes,85 but Rule 403
75. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
76. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
77. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
78. United States v. Diaz, 961 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1992).
79. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
80. Id.
81. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
82. United States v. Murphy, 241 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.
Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1074 (6th Cir. 1996)).
83. United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394-95 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Taniguchi, 49 Fed. Appx. 506, 514-16 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Rrapi, 175 F.3d 742,
748 (9th Cir. 1999).
84. United States v. Ruiz-Estrada, 312 F.3d 398, 403 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Denberg, 212 F.3d 987, 992-94 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 993-
97 (4th Cir. 1997).
85. See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that
determination must be made under Rule 404(b) whether evidence is relevant and has a
proper purpose).
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balancing still occurs even with evidence that falls within the scope
permitted by Rule 404.86 However, the issue under Rule 404(b), unlike that
under Rule 401, is not just whether the evidence is relevant, but rather
whether it is relevant for a non-forbidden purpose, making de novo review
appropriate to make certain that the policies underlying Rule 404 are not
undermined. Thus, combining the application of the Rules 404(b) and 403,
the determination whether evidence falls within the scope of Rule 404(b) is
reviewed de novo, but the trial court's decision to admit evidence falling
within the scope of Rule 404(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.87
Rule 405(a) provides that "[iun all cases in which evidence of
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be
made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion."88 Before a witness can give reputation testimony, a foundation
must first be laid that the witness is familiar with the person's reputation in
the relevant community; for the witness to give opinion testimony, a
foundation must first be laid that the witness has an adequate familiarity
with the person.89 The trial court's factual finding that the witness has the
requisite familiarity is one reviewed deferentially on appeal.9 ° Rule 405(a)
goes on to provide that "[o]n cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into
relevant specific instances of conduct."'" The interpretation of this proviso
is de novo, such as the determination whether an opinion witness can be
asked questions in the form of "have you heard" on cross-examination. 92
The trial court retains discretion to limit the cross-examination allowed
under Rule 405(a), and its exercise of such discretion is reviewed for abuse
of discretion, 93 but if the limits placed on cross-examination by a criminal
defendant are sufficiently severe, he might be able to make out a
Confrontation Clause claim, which would be reviewed de novo on appeal.94
Rule 405(b) provides that "[i]n cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense,
86. United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v.
Stevens, 303 F.3d 711, 716 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764-65
(7th Cir. 2002).
87. Cruz, 326 F.3d at 394-95; United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577, 587 (6th
Cir. 1998).
88. FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
89. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478 (1948); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 51, § 4.19, at 306-08.
90. United States v. Herder, 59 Fed. Appx. 257, 266-67 (10th Cir. 2003).
91. FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
92. SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1169-70 (10th Cir. 1992).
93. United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Smith, 26 F.3d 739, 755 (7th Cir. 1994).
94. See infra note 448 and accompanying text.
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proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct."95
Whether character is "an essential element" of a charge or defense
implicates the underlying substantive law and is thus properly viewed as a
question of law subject to de novo review.96
Rule 406 provides that:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an
organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the
presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of
the person or organization on a particular occasion was in
conformity with the habit or routine practice.
97
Because factual matters such as the frequency, regularity, and uniformity of
prior conduct predominate in the determination of whether the prior
conduct of an individual or an organization rises to the level of habit or
routine practice, review on appeal is deferential. 98 However, appellate
courts will sometimes hold as a matter of law that certain types of conduct
could never be deemed to be evidence of "habit." 99
Rule 407 provides that:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event,
measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct,
a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for
a warning or instruction.'00
The interpretation of the scope of Rule 407 is a question of law reviewed
de novo,' 0' such as whether the rule applies in diversity cases, 0 2 what
95. FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
96. Schafer v. Time, Inc., 142 F.3d 1361, 1370-72 & n.12 (1 th Cir. 1998).
97. FED. R. EVID. 406.
98. United States v. Angwin, 271 F.3d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Yazzie, 188 F.3d 1178, 1187-90 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Santa, 180 F.3d 20, 29
(2d Cir. 1999); Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 1519, 1524 (11th Cir.
1985).
99. See Camfield v. Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2001); Weil v.
Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1459-61 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d
1428, 1454-55 (10th Cir. 1987).
100. FED. R. EVID. 407.
101. Goehler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99-2057, 2000 WL 1161700, at *1 (4th Cir.
Aug. 17, 2000); Stanley v. Aeroquip Corp., Nos. 97-6472, 97-6475, 98-5005, 1999 WL
266250, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1999); see McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 672
F.2d 652, 665 (8th Cir. 1982).
102. See Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275-78 (3d Cir. 1992); Moe v.
Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 930-34 (10th Cir. 1984).
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qualifies as a "measure,"'0 3 whether the word "event" refers to the time of
injury or the time of manufacture,10 4 and the like.' Some courts indicate
that they review Rule 407 decisions for "abuse of discretion," but in
reading the decisions it is clear that where the question involves an
interpretation of the rule, review is made under the de novo prong of the
"abuse of discretion" standard. 16 Rule 407 goes on to provide that it "does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered
for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment,"'1 7 but the trial
court still retains discretion to exclude such evidence under Rule 403, and
this decision is reviewed deferentially on appeal.'o 8
Rule 408 provides that:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or
(2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible.' 0 9
The interpretation of the scope of the rule is de novo, such as the meaning
of the word "disputed"" 0 or whether the rule covers settlement offers made
pursuant to statutory responsibilities."' However, the trial court's factual
findings in applying the rule are reviewed for clear error, such as the
finding that a dispute existed" 2 or the finding that the parties were engaged
in "compromise negotiations."' 3 The rule goes on to provide that it "does
103. In re Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1997).
104. Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1481-83 (10th Cir. 1990).
105. See Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1275-78 (pre-1997 amendment case determining whether
rule applies in strict liability cases).
106. See Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558, 1560-61 (2d Cir. 1992); Pau v.
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1991); Specht v. Jensen, 863
F.2d 700, 701-02 (10th Cir. 1988); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191, 1197-
98 (3d Cir. 1987).
107. FED. R. EVID. 407.
108. See Reese v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1429 (5th
Cir. 1986).
109. FED. R. EVID. 408.
110. Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 526-30 (3d Cir.
1995).
111. Reeder v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 892, 894-95 (10th Cir. 1996).
112. Affiliated Mfrs., Inc., 56 F.3d at 526, 528 (3d Cir. 1995).
113. First Interstate Bank of Billings v. United States, 61 F.3d 876, 882 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Trans Union Credit Info. Co. v. Associated Credit Serv., Inc., 805 F.2d 188, 192 (6th
Cir. 1986).
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not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose,
such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution[,]""' 4 but as with Rule 407, the trial court may still exclude
evidence offered for such other purposes under Rule 403, subject to review
only for abuse of discretion."5
Closely related to Rule 408 is Rule 409, which provides that
"[e]vidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital,
or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove
liability for the injury.""' 6 The interpretation of the scope of the rule is de
novo, such as the determination whether it applies in a trial on the issue of
damages in light of its limitation that it bars evidence used to prove
liability.' 7  As with Rules 407 and 408, even when evidence is not
forbidden by Rule 409, the trial court may still exclude the evidence under
Rule 403, and the decision to do so is reviewed deferentially. 1 8
Rule 410 provides that, with certain exceptions, evidence of a
withdrawn guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, or statements made in the
course of plea proceedings or plea discussions related to such withdrawn
guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere are not in any civil or criminal case
admissible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the
plea discussions.119 Review of the trial court's interpretation of the rule is
de novo, such as the determination whether the rule covers statements
made to foreign prosecutors, 20 or whether the rule applies in sentencing
proceedings.' 2' Appellate courts usually review the finding by the trial
court that the parties were engaged in "plea discussions" at the time the
statement was made for clear error. 122
Rule 411 provides that "[e]vidence that a person was or was not
insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person
114. FED. R. EVID. 408.
115. Trebor Sportswear Co. v. Limited Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1989);
Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652, 654-55 (4th Cir. 1988); Belton v.
Fibreboard Corp., 724 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1984).
116. FED. R. EVID. 409.
117. Williams v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 11 F.3d 132, 135 (10th Cir. 1993).
118. Savoie v. Otto Candies, Inc., 692 F.2d 363, 370 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1982).
119. FED. R. EVID. 410.
120. United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, 320 F.3d 328, 330-32 (2d Cir. 2003).
121. United States v. Medina-Estrada, 81 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1996).
122. United States v. Gonzalez, No. 96-3083, 1997 WL 7273, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 9,
1997); United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483, 491 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1988). But see United States v. Young, 223 F.3d
905, 908 (8th Cir. 2000) (de novo review); United States v. Morgan, 91 F.3d 1193, 1195-96
& n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
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acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully."'' 23 Interpretation of the scope
of the rule is properly de novo, such as the determination whether the
phrase "insured against liability" includes being indemnified by the
government. 124 The rule goes on to provide that it "does not require the
exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for
another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or
prejudice of a witness[,]' 125 and as with Rules 407, 408, and 409, the trial
court's decision to admit such evidence for "another purpose" is subject to
exclusion under Rule 403, and its decision to do so is reviewed
deferentially.
26
Rule 412(a) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, evidence
offered to prove a victim's "sexual predisposition"'' 27 or to prove that a
victim "engaged in other sexual behavior" '28 is not admissible in any
"proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct."' 29  Decisions
interpreting the scope of the rule are de novo, 3 ° such as the determination
whether a particular case falls within the definition of a "proceeding
involving alleged sexual misconduct,"'' or the meaning of the term
"sexual predisposition."' 3 2 Rule 412(b)(1) provides that:
In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury or other physical
evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim with respect to the person accused of sexual
misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the
prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
123. FED. R. EVID. 411.
124. Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1520 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1994).
125. FED. R. EVID. 411.
126. Pinkham v. Burgess, 933 F.2d 1066, 1072 (1st Cir. 1991); Morrissey v. Welsh
Co., 821 F.2d 1294, 1305-06 (8th Cir. 1987).
127. FED. R. EVlD. 412.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. United States v. Alexander, No. 94-10568, 1996 WL 19179, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan.
18, 1996).
131. See United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542, 547-48 (10th Cir. 1991).
132. See FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory committee's note.
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constitutional rights of the defendant. 133
The interpretation of the scope of these exceptions is a question of law
reviewed de novo, 13 4 and in the context of Rule 412(b)(1)(C), so is the
independent, but related, Confrontation Clause claim.' 35  Rule 412(b)(2)
provides a balancing test for admitting such evidence in civil cases that
requires that the "probative value [of the evidence] substantially outweigh[]
the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. '"136
The trial court's application of this balancing test, like its application. of the
Rule 403 balancing test, is reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal. 137
Rule 413(a) provides that "[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant
is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible,
and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant.' 1 38  Rule 414(a) provides a similar rule for the admission of
evidence of prior offenses of child molestation in cases in which the
defendant is accused of child molestation, 139 and Rule 415(a) provides for
the admission of such evidence in civil cases "predicated on a party's
alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or
child molestation .... ,,140 Appellate courts exercise de novo review over
the determination whether a particular offense falls within the definition of
an "offense of sexual assault" in Rules 413 and 415... or the definition of
an "offense of child molestation" in Rules 414 and 415.142 Whether Rule
403 balancing applies to evidence that fits within the scope of Rules 413
through 415 is a question of law reviewed de novo, 143 but the trial court's
application of Rule 403 balancing to evidence admissible under these rules
is subject only to abuse of discretion review.44
133. FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(1).
134. See United States v. White Buffalo, 84 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1996).
135. United States v. Powell, 226 F.3d 1181, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000); Alexander, 1996
WL 19179, at *3.
136. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
137. Warren v. Prejean, 301 F.3d 893, 906 (8th Cir. 2002); Rodriguez-Hemandez v.
Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1998); Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339,
1341-43 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
138. FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
139. FED. R. EvID. 414(a).
140. FED. R. EvID. 415(a).
141. Johnson v. Elk Lake School Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 149-159 (3d Cir. 2002).
142. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 897-98 (10th Cir. 1999) (de novo
review of trial court's legal interpretation of Rule 414).
143. Johnson, 283 F.3d at 155; United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1329 (10th
Cir. 1998).
144. United States v. Fool Bull, No. 01-2944, 2002 WL 113839, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 30,
2002); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959-60 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mann,
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A specialized form of relevance is conditional relevance. When a
spoken statement is relied upon to prove that notice was given to a certain
person, evidence that the statement was made is without probative value
unless that person heard the statement being made. 145 Thus, the relevance
of the evidence that the statement was made is conditioned on there being
evidence that the person heard the statement being made. Rule 104(b)
addresses this situation, providing that "[w]hen the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a
finding of the fulfillment of the condition."' 14' Under this rule, the judge
plays only a screening role, admitting the conditionally relevant evidence
so long as she determines that a jury could reasonably find that the
condition was fulfilled. 47  The trial court's determination that there is
sufficient evidence to support a finding of the fulfillment of a condition
under Rule 104(b) is reviewed deferentially on appeal. 148  Under Rule
104(a), however, evidentiary issues other than conditional relevance are for
the judge alone to decide: "[p]reliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b)."'149  Like Rule 104(b) determinations, the
factual findings made by the trial court for evidentiary issues falling within
the scope of Rule 104(a) are reviewed for clear error on appeal.' 50
193 F.3d 1172, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lawrence, No. 97-4480, 1999 WL
551358, at *1-2 (6th Cir. July 19, 1999); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1997).
145. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee's note.
146. FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
147. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee's note.
148. Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 1995); Veranda Beach
Club Ltd. v. W. Sur. Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1372 (1st Cir. 1991).
149. FED. R. EvID. 104(a). The rule continues: "In making its determination it is not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges." Id. Whether
hearings on preliminary matters should be conducted outside the jury's presence is governed
by Rule 104(c), which provides that "[h]earings on the admissibility of confessions shall in
all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters
shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a witness
and so requests." FED. R. EvID. 104(c). The trial court's determination that the "'interests of
justice require"' that a hearing be held outside the jury's presence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1263 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 104(c)); United States v. Peele, 574 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 1978).
150. Re/Max Intern., Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999);
Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1208 (3d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 959 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Cardall, 885
F.2d 656, 668 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1986).
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However, whether something is governed by Rule 104(a) or instead by
Rule 104(b) is a question of law reviewed de novo.' 51
An example of conditional relevance is the requirement that evidence
be authenticated or identified; an item of evidence, such as the written
contract in a contract dispute, is irrelevant unless the contract is in fact the
contract at issue and not a forgery.152 Rule 901(a) governs authentication,
and provides that "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims." '153 The decisions rather uniformly hold that the trial court's factual
determination that the foundation evidence provided is sufficient to support
a finding by the jury of authenticity is reviewed deferentially on appeal.15 4
However, if the trial court misconstrues the rule, such as interpreting it to
require that the judge himself be convinced that the item is authentic (as
opposed to simply making the determination that a reasonable jury could so
find), that would be an error of law reviewed de novo. 155 Rule 901(b) sets
forth a series of examples by which evidence can be authenticated, but
makes clear that the list is intended to be "[b]y way of illustration only, and
not by way of limitation .*. .""' Thus, were a trial court to exclude
evidence on the ground that it was not authenticated in accordance with any
of the examples set forth in Rule 901(b), that would be an error in
interpreting the rule subject to de novo review.'57
Rule 902 sets forth a list of documents that are "self-authenticating,"
meaning that evidence of authenticity is not required as a condition
precedent to the admissibility of such documents.' 58 For example, Rule
151. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686-92 (interpreting FED. R. EvID. 404(b)).
152. See FED. R. EvID. 901(a) advisory committee's note ("Authentication and
identification represent a special aspect of relevancy.... Thus a telephone conversation may
be irrelevant because on an unrelated topic or because the speaker is not identified. The
latter aspect is the one here involved.").
153. FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
154. United States v. Patterson, 277 F.3d 709, 713 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322
(11 th Cir. 2000); United States v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Alicea-Cardoza, 132 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154,
167-68 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 801-02 (10th Cir. 1980).
155. See Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1410-11 (2d Cir. 1996).
156. FED. R. EVID. 901(b).
157. Traction Wholesale Ctr. Co. v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 92, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2000); First
State Bank of Denton v. Md. Cas. Co., 918 F.2d 38, 40-41 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Ochoa-Victoria, Nos. 87-5232, 87-5233, 1988 WL 74747, at *2-3 (9th Cir. July 6, 1988); In
re Bobby Boggs, Inc., 819 F.2d 574, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Alessi, 638
F.2d 466, 480 (2d Cir. 1980).
158. FED. R. EVID. 902.
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902(6) provides that "[p]rinted materials purporting to be newspapers or
periodicals" are self-authenticating.' 59 The trial court's findings with
respect to the factual predicates for invoking any of the provisions
contained in Rule 902 are reviewed deferentially on appeal. 160 However,
the interpretation of the text of Rule 902, such as an interpretation of the
self-authenticating effect of such evidence in terms of admissibility,' 6 ' is
subject to de novo review on appeal.'62
Finally, Rule 903 provides that "[t]he testimony of a subscribing
witness is not necessary to authenticate a writing unless required by the
laws of the jurisdiction whose laws govern the validity of the writing."'' 63
The trial court's determination as to the content of the law governing the
validity of the writing would be a question of law subject to de novo
review. 164
159. FED. R. EvID. 902(6).
160. United States v. Harrison, No. 97-4178, 1999 WL 26921, at *6 (4th Cir. Jan. 25,
1999) (trial court's finding that document admitted under Rule 902(1) bears "a seal
'purporting to be' that of the United States or a political subdivision thereof .... ").
161. United States v. Bisbee, 245 F.3d 1001, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Bisbee argues
that this rule creates only a rebuttable presumption of admissibility that he has rebutted ....
Bisbee mischaracterizes the rule .... That Bisbee presented evidence tending to contradict
the facts... does not render the properly admitted evidence inadmissible."); United States
v. Carriger, 592 F.2d 312, 316-17 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[R]ule 902 dispenses with a requirement
of extrinsic evidence for admissibility. By requiring proof of the underlying transaction as a
condition for admission the district court denied the defendant the benefit of the rule.").
162. United States v. Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d 1039, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The de
novo standard applies when issues of law predominate in the district court's evidentiary
analysis, and the abuse-of-discretion standard applies when the inquiry is 'essentially
factual."'); Whitted v. Gen. Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The
owner's manual is not a trade inscription and admitting the manual because it had a trade
inscription on its cover does not comport with the rule. Therefore, Rule 902(7) does not
apply here."); United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[R]ule 902(4) does
not contemplate that 'official records' must be filed or recorded in a public office to be self-
authenticating.").
163. FED. R. EVlD. 903.
164. Cf infra notes 392-393, 398-399, 523-525 and accompanying text. The
likelihood, however, that this question will ever arise, is virtually non-existent.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 9.31, at 1048 (3d ed.
2003). Mueller and Kirkpatrick stated:
The primary instance in which attestation continues to be required as a condition
of validity is wills .... Wills are not probated in federal court, so it is highly
unlikely that FRE 903 will ever require deferral to state law in the single instance
where production of attesting witnesses is most commonly required.
Id. See generally Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate
Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479 (2001) (discussing the
limits of federal court jurisdiction over probate matters).
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II. THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The rule against hearsay provides that "[h]earsay is not admissible
except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
165
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted."'166  This definition raises two interpretative
questions: what is a "statement," and, when is a statement offered "to prove
the truth of the matter asserted?" The first of these is answered by Rule
801(a), which defines a statement as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion."' 67 The second of these is answered in the official commentary
to Rule 801(c), which provides that "[i]f the significance of an offered
statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the
truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay."' 68 This would
include situations in which the evidence is offered to impeach a witness,
when the statement is a so-called "verbal act," or when the evidence is
offered to show the effect a statement had on another person, such as to
prove notice or the like. 169
Consider a trial in which an attorney claims that the evidence he seeks
to offer into evidence is not subject to exclusion under the hearsay rule
because it is being offered for some reason other than to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, such as to impeach a witness or to show the effect on
the person who heard it. Suppose the trial judge nonetheless excludes the
evidence on the ground that it is hearsay. By what standard should a court
of appeals review this determination? This involves an interpretation of the
meaning of the text of the hearsay rule, to wit, what it means for something
to be "offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted," and thus is a
question of law that should be reviewed de novo. Some appellate decisions
explicitly state that they apply de novo review on this issue, 7' while others
implicitly appear to be applying de novo review.'7 ' Still others state that
165. FED. R. EVID. 802.
166. FED. R. EvID. 80 1(c).
167. FED. R. EvID. 80 1(a).
168. FED. R. EvID. 801(c) advisory committee's note.
169. See MUELLER& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 51, §§ 8.16-8.18, at 821-25.
170. E.g., Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2002); Jacklyn v. Schering-
Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Garcia-Villanueva, No. 87-5261, 1988 WL 86215, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 1988).
171. E.g., Lyons P'ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th Cir. 2001);
Shafii v. PLC British Airways, 22 F.3d 59, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1994); Keisling v. SER-Jobs for
Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 762 (1st Cir. 1994).
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they are applying "abuse of discretion" review, but it is clear from the
opinions that they are applying the de novo prong of the "abuse of
discretion" standard. 7
2
Consider instead a trial in which the dispute centers on whether or not
something falls within the definition of the word "statement." In most
cases, the parties are unlikely to dispute this issue, yet in the case of
nonverbal conduct, a determination must be made whether the conduct was
"intended by the person as an assertion."'7 This finding of intent is clearly
a factual finding, as the official commentary to Rule 801(a) notes, 174 thus
making it appropriate to be reviewed only for clear error. 75 Yet consider
instead the question whether the word "conduct" includes non-affirmative
conduct, such as silence (in the sense of an absence of complaints). This
raises a question of law as to the meaning of the term "conduct," subject to
de novo review.1
76
Of course, even if a statement falls within the definition of "hearsay,"
it may nonetheless be admissible. Rule 801(d) provides that eight types of
statements that fall within the formal definition of hearsay are nonetheless
"not hearsay."'' 77 Rule 803 sets forth a list of twenty-three unrestricted
exceptions to the hearsay rule, 178 and Rule 804 sets forth a list of five
restricted exceptions to the hearsay rule, which apply only if the declarant
is "unavailable" to testify as a witness. 179 Finally, Rule 807 provides a
"catchall" hearsay exception for statements that do not fall within any of
the recognized exceptions but that have equivalent guarantees of
trustworthiness. 8 0  Thus, the parties may agree that a statement is
172. United States v. Harris, 281 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002); Guider v. Patriot
News, 33 Fed. Appx. 627, 629-30 (3d Cir. 2002); Trepel v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 194 F.3d
708, 716-17 (6th Cir. 1999).
173. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(2) (emphasis added).
174. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note ("When evidence of conduct is
offered on the theory that it is not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a preliminary
determination will be required to determine whether an assertion is intended.... The
determination involves no greater difficulty than many other preliminary questions of
fact.").
175. The author was not able to find any cases stating a standard of review on this
issue.
176. E.g., Columbia Communications Corp. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., Nos. 99-1761,
99-1835, 00-1626, 2001 WL 62923, at *7 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2001).
177. FED. R. EvID. 801(d).
178. FED. R. EvID. 803. They are so named because they apply without requiring a
showing that the declarant is unavailable; the rationale is that long-standing experience has
shown these categories of statements, although hearsay, are reliable. WEINSTEIN, supra note
51, § 803.02, at 803-12 to 13.
179. FED. R. EVID. 804.
180. FED. R. EvID. 807.
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"hearsay," but disagree over whether the statement falls within one of these
various exceptions to the hearsay rule.' 81 Whether on appeal the scope of
review is de novo or only for clear error will depend on whether the
challenge is one to the trial court's factual findings made in the course of
determining whether the foundational prerequisites for invoking the
exception are satisfied, or if instead the challenge is to the trial court's
interpretation of the text of the exception. As shall be demonstrated for
each of the hearsay exceptions, a slight re-phrasing of the question
presented on appeal can turn an inquiry from a review of a factual finding
to a review of a legal determination, thus changing the scope of review and
perhaps the outcome of the appeal.
Rule 801(d)(1) defines three types of prior statements by a witness as
"not hearsay," all of which apply only if"[t]he declarant testifies at the trial
or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement .... 2 The first type of prior statement by a witness is one that
is "inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
in a deposition .... 1 83 In applying this exception, several interpretive
questions arise, including what falls within the scope of the phrase "other
proceeding," what does it mean to be "inconsistent," and what does it mean
to be "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement?" The first is
a pure question of law involving the interpretation of the text of the
exception that appellate courts appear to review de novo. 184 The second,
depending on the way in which it is phrased, might be a question of law or
a finding of fact. If the issue is whether the word "inconsistent" means that
the statements must be "diametrically opposed" or whether a claim of
feigned memory loss or an evasive answer at trial can be deemed
"inconsistent" with a prior statement, that is a legal issue involving an
interpretation of the text of the exception subject to de novo review.1 85 Yet
with those parameters in mind, if the question is whether the district court
erred in finding or failing to find the two statements to be "inconsistent"
with one another based on its determination that the witness was or was not
181. Although technically, statements covered by Rule 801(d) are "not hearsay," in
substance, they are indistinguishable from exceptions.
182. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
183. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
184. See, e.g., United States v Micke, 859 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1988) (investigative
interview does not qualify as an "other proceeding"); United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d
1314, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 1985) (grand jury testimony qualifies as an "other proceeding");
United States v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 109 F.3d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 608 (7th Cir. 1984).
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feigning memory loss or evading the question, that is a factual finding
subject to deferential review.'86 The third interpretive question, depending
on how phrased, likewise might be viewed as a question of law or a finding
of fact. If the question is, for example, whether the requirement that the
person who made the statement be "subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement" means that the witness need only be subject to
questioning or must also remember the events underlying the statement,
that is a question of law reviewed de novo, yet with the requirement
defined, the finding by the trial court that the standard was satisfied is a
factual finding reviewed deferentially.'
87
The second type of prior statement by a witness is one that is
"consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive." '8 The application of this exception raises several
interpretative questions, including what qualifies as a charge of "fabrication
or improper influence or motive" and what is meant by "consistent"? This
exception has been interpreted to allow the admission only of prior
consistent statements made before the alleged motive to fabricate arose, 189 a
question of law reviewed de novo.19 ° However, with that legal standard in
mind, the determinations of when the motive to lie arose and when the prior
statement was made in relation to when the motive to lie arose are factual
findings subject to review only for clear error.'9 1 Moreover, the
determination that an express or implied charge of fabrication or improper
motive has been made is likewise a factual finding subject to deferential
review.' 92 As to the second interpretative question, the interpretation of the
186. E.g., Williams, 737 F.2d at 608. The court in Williams stated:
As long as people speak in nonmathematical languages such as English, however,
it will be difficult to determine precisely whether two statements are
inconsistent .... In view of the multitude of factors, a district court's ruling under
801 (d)(1)(A) will be disturbed only if an abuse of discretion.
Id.; Matlock, 109 F.3d at 1319; United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 958 (6th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976).
187. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561-64 (1988) (considering issue in
context of Rule 801(d)(1)(C)); United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); DiCaro, 772 F.2d at 1322-25. Note that this element likewise
applies to the other two types of prior statements by a witness discussed below. See infra
notes 188-196 and accompanying text.
188. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
189. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (1995).
190. United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 349 (10th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds,
513 U.S. 150 (1995).
191. E.g., United States v. Toney, 161 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 1998) (clear error
standard); United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1329 (1st Cir. 1988) (same).
192. E.g., United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (abuse of
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scope of the word "consistent" as not requiring that the two statements be
"identical in every detail" is a question of law reviewed de novo,'9 3 while
the finding that the statements were or were not consistent is a factual
finding subject to deferential review. 194
The third type of prior statement by a witness is "one of identification
of a person made after perceiving the person."'95 If a question arises as to
this exception's scope, such as what it means to "perceiv[e]" a person (in
other words, does it include only seeing, or does it also include hearing or
smelling a person?), that is a question of law reviewed de novo. 196
Rule 801(d)(2) defines five types of "admissions" by an opposing
party as "not hearsay," all of which apply only if the statement is offered
against a party.' 97  The first type of admission is "the party's own
statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity."' 98 The trial
court need not itself find that the person actually made the statement, but
only that a reasonable jury could so find,' 99 a determination reviewed
deferentially on appeal.20 ' The interpretation of the scope of the exception
is reviewed de novo, such as whether it applies if the party opponent is
deceased at the time of trial.20'
The second type of admission is "a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth. '2 2  As with individual
admissions, the trial court need not itself find that the person actually
adopted the statement, but only that a reasonable jury could so find, which
often will involve a finding that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to
find that the statement was heard, understood, and acceded to by the
party,20 3 a factual finding subject to deferential review on appeal. 2°
discretion standard); United States v. Young, 105 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (clear error
standard); United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1505 (3d Cir. 1988) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
193. Vest, 842 F.2d at 1329.
194. Cf supra note 186.
195. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
196. Owens, 789 F.2d at 755; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 164, §
8.26, at 765.
197. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
198. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
199. See, e.g., United States v. White, No. 93-10095, 1994 WL 162068, at *2 (9th Cir.
Apr. 29, 1994).
200. See supra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
201. Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1200-01 (3d Cir. 1989); see also United States
v. Erickson, 75 F.3d 470, 479 (9th Cir. 1996) (de novo review of construction of Rule
801(d)(2)(A)).
202. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
203. United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985).
204. See United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 413 (7th Cir. 1993) (abuse of discretion);
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Alternatively, adoption may be manifested by silence, if "the person would,
under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence if
untrue, 2 °5 a factual finding likewise reviewed deferentially.0 6
The third type of admission is "a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject."207 The finding that
the person was so "authorized" is a factual determination by the trial judge
subject to deferential appellate review.2 8  Closely related to this is the
fourth type of admission, "a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship. '209 Generally, the application of
this rule involves factual findings by the trial judge reviewed deferentially,
such as the finding that an agency relationship exists, 210 or the finding that
the matter spoken of was within the scope of the agency or employment.21
Yet a misconstruction of the exception is reviewed de novo, such as an
interpretation by the trial court of the phrase "agent or servant" as being
limited to those who have "speaking authority" (a vestige of the common
law rule not incorporated into the codified rule),212 or a determination by
the trial court that the statement cannot be admitted under this rule if the
agent has died.213
The fifth type of admission is "a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. "214 Factual
pre-requisites to the application of this exception include findings that (1) a
conspiracy existed; (2) that the party was a member of the conspiracy when
the statement was made; and (3) the statement was made during the course
United States v. Nwanze, No. 92-5415, 1993 WL 375787, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1993)
(same); United States v. Furukawa, No. 93-50605, 1996 WL 601439, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 17,
1996) (same).
205. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee's note.
206. United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir. 1991); Monks, 774 F.2d at
950.
207. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
208. See Womack v. Tierco Md. Inc., Nos. 01-1947, 01-1984, 2002 WL 1155558, at
*5 (4th Cir. May 31, 2002); Linder & Assoc., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 F.3d 547,
551 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Dunham, No. 89-10386, 1991 WL 83926, at *2 (9th
Cir. May 20, 1991).
209. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
210. E.g., United States v. Agne, 214 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2000).
211. E.g., Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., No. 96-6654, 1998
WL 199717, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 1998); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1262 (9th Cir.
1982).
212. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 558 n.10 (11 th Cir.
1998).
213. See White v. Honeywell, Inc., 141 F.3d 1270, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1998).
214. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
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of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and such factual findings by the
trial judge are reviewed deferentially on appeal.215
The first two unrestricted hearsay exceptions are (1) present sense
impressions, which provides an exception for "[a] statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving
the event or condition, or immediately thereafter,"'2 16 and (2) excited
utterances, which provides an exception for "[a] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition. 12 7 For the present sense
impression exception to apply, the trial court must determine that the
statement was made contemporaneously with (or just after) the event or
condition being described. 21 8 For the excited utterance exception to apply,
the trial court must find that: (1) a startling event or condition occurred; (2)
that the declarant made the statement while under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition; and (3) that the statement relates to the
startling event or condition.2" 9 The factual findings by the trial court with
regard to whether an event or condition occurred, the lapse of time between
an event or condition and the making of the statement, and (in the case of
the excited utterance exception) whether the declarant was "under the stress
of excitement" when the statement was made are reviewed deferentially on
appeal.22 Yet courts distinguish between the factual and legal conclusions
of a trial court under these two exceptions, applying deferential review to
the former but de novo review to the latter.22' Thus, an interpretation of the
exception as allowing the statement itself to serve as sufficient proof to
215. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180 (1st Cir. 1993) (clear error);
United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc., 195 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); United
States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Shores, 33 F.3d
438, 442 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Green, 180 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1999)
(same); United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1007 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); United
States v. Westmoreland, 312 F.3d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Arias,
252 F.3d 973, 976-77 (8th Cir. 2001) (abuse of discretion); United States v. Bowman, 215
F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2000) (clear error); United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d 1235,
1242 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11 th Cir. 2002)
(same); United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same).
216. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
217. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
218. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee's note.
219. United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2000).
220. United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1999) (abuse of discretion);
United States v. Martin, 59 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Taylor,
No. 92-5120, 1992 WL 322369, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1992) (clear error).
221. United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. King,
No. 99-2363, 2000 WL 1028228, at *2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2000); United States v. Brown,
254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001); Taylor, 1992 WL 322369, at *3.
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establish the occurrence of the startling event without need to resort to
independent corroborating evidence is a question of law reviewed de
novo. 222 And while deferring to the trial court's factual determination
whether or not a person was still "under the stress of excitement" when the
statement was made, appellate courts may, as a matter of law, delineate
appropriate factors to consider in making such a finding, such as the age of
the declarant.223 One could also imagine a situation in which the court is
asked to determine whether something falls within the definitions of the
word "event or condition," in which case de novo review would likewise be
appropriate.
The third unrestricted hearsay exception provides an exception for
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.224
Successful invocation of this exception requires that the district judge find
that it is reasonably likely that the statement reflects the person's "true
then-existing state of mind" based on a determination that there was no
time for reflection and, thus, misrepresentation-a factual finding reviewed
deferentially on appeal. 225  However, when a ruling by the trial court
involves an interpretation of the scope of the rule, review is de novo, such
as the meaning of the proviso excluding from the scope of the exception "a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed. 226
The fourth unrestricted hearsay exception is that for "[s]tatements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. ' 227 The factual
222. As a matter of law, however, some appellate courts hold that it is within the trial
court's discretion to determine whether independent corroborating evidence should be
produced. E.g., Brown, 254 F.3d at 459.
223. E.g., King, 2000 WL 1028228, at *4-5; Martin, 59 F.3d at 769.
224. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (emphasis added).
225. E.g., Colasanto v. Life Ins. Co., 100 F.3d 203, 212-13 (1st Cir. 1996); United
States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1987).
226. United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 726-27 (3d Cir. 1999); Emmert, 829
F.2d at 809-10; see also Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thien, 63 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 1995)
(stating "abuse of discretion" but evidently examining the issue de novo).
227. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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findings by the trial court that such a statement was made by the declarant
with the intent ("for the purposes") of promoting diagnosis or treatment, as
well as the finding that such information is "reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment," are factual determinations reviewed
deferentially.22 However, the interpretation of the rule as including
statements made to social workers 29  or to psychiatrists and
psychologists 230 is a question of law subject to de novo review.
The fifth unrestricted hearsay exception is that for
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection
to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was
fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge
correctly.23'
The trial court's factual findings that the witness once had knowledge about
the facts contained in the document, that the witness now has insufficient
memory to testify about the matters in the document, and that the document
was recorded at a time when the matters were fresh in the witness' mind
and that it correctly reflects the witness' knowledge of the matters are
reviewed deferentially on appeal.232 However, there is de novo review of
interpretations of the scope of the exception, such as an interpretation of it
as per se excluding law enforcement reports,233 or an interpretation of it as
requiring that the writing be made contemporaneously with the event.234
The sixth unrestricted exception is for records of a regularly
conducted business activity.2 3 The factual findings by the trial court of
228. E.g., United States v. Yazzie, No. 00-10517, 2002 WL 465160, at *4 (9th Cir.
Mar. 15, 2002); United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir. 2000).
229. Davignon v. Clemmey, 322 F.3d 1, 8 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2003).
230. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949 n.17 (4th Cir. 1988).
231. FED. R. EvID. 803(5). The exception continues: "If admitted, the memorandum or
record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered
by an adverse party." Id.
232. E.g., United States v. Smith, 197 F.3d 225, 231 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Patterson, 678 F.2d 774, 778-79 (9th Cir. 1982).
233. United States v. Pena-Gutierrez, 222 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1986).
234. Smith, 197 F.3d at 231.
235. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Rule 803(6) provides an exception for:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all
as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by
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each of the foundational elements for invoking the exception are reviewed
deferentially. 236 However, interpretations of the scope of the rule are
reviewed de novo,237 such as an interpretation of it as covering only
documents made by the business and not those received by it,238 or an
interpretation of it as not covering law enforcement reports.239 Closely
related is the seventh unrestricted exception, which provides an exception
for evidence of the absence of an entry in records of regularly kept
activity.24° Here, too, the trial court's factual findings on the foundational
requirements for invoking the exception are reviewed deferentially. 24'
The eighth unrestricted exception is that for "[p]ublic records and
reports," which provides an exception for
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of
certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute
permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business"
as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
Id.
236. E.g., United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002); Harcros
Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d at 556; Hargett v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, 78 F.3d 836, 841-42 (2d
Cir. 1996); United States v. LaValley, 957 F.2d 1309, 1314 (6th Cir. 1992).
237. United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Salerno, No. 95-10028, 1996 WL 169239, at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 1996).
238. E.g., Salerno, 1996 WL 169239, at *7.
239. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 77 (2d Cir. 1977) (not stating standard of
review).
240. See FED. R. EVID. 803(7). Rule 803(7) provides an exception for:
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data
compilations in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6),
to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a
kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly
made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id. (emphasis added).
241. E.g., Candelaria v. Coughlin, 133 F.3d 906, 907 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1987).
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trustworthiness.242
The trial court's factual findings with respect to the foundational
prerequisites for invoking this exception, such as trustworthiness and first-
hand observation by the person making the report, are reviewed
deferentially, 243 although if the trial court were to determine trustworthiness
based on an improper factor, that would be an error of law subject to de
novo review. 244 One of the foundational prerequisites-that the matter is
observed pursuant to a "duty imposed by law" 245 or an investigation is
"made pursuant to authority granted by law"246-seems to be reviewed de
novo, which makes sense given that this involves more a question of law
than a finding of fact.247 Furthermore, the interpretation of the scope of the
rule, such as what sorts of individuals fall within the scope of the phrase
"other law enforcement personnel, 248 is a question of law that should be
reviewed de novo.249 In addition, interpreting this exception as pre-
empting the use of any other exception to admit law enforcement reports is
a question of law subject to de novo review. 250
Closely related to the eighth unrestricted exception is the tenth
unrestricted exception, which excepts from the hearsay rule a certification
or testimony offered
[t]o prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data
compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of
a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation,
in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office
or agency, . that a diligent search failed to disclose the record,
report, statement, data compilation, or entry.2
Factual findings by the trial court in applying this exception, such as a
finding that a "diligent search" 25 2 was undertaken, are subject to deferential
242. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
243. United States v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 974 F.2d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1992); In re
Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
244. In re Japanese Electronics, 723 F.2d at 265-66.
245. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
246. Id.
247. See Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 974 F.2d at 626 n.11 (citing 22 C.F.R. §
211.9(c)(1)(ii) (1992)); Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1046 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-103 (1965)).
248. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
249. United States v. Riddle, 103 F.3d 423, 430-32 (5th Cir. 1997); Oates, 560 F.2d at
67-68.
250. See supra note 239.
251. FED. R. EVID. 803(10).
252. Id.
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review on appeal.253
The ninth unrestricted exception is that for "[r]ecords of vital
statistics," which provides an exception for "[r]ecords or data compilations,
in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report
thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law. 254 As
with the exception for public records generally, the finding that the report
was made pursuant to the requirements of law is the sort of question for
which de novo review is appropriate. 5
The eleventh unrestricted exception is that for "[r]ecords of religious
organizations," which provides an exception for "[s]tatements of birth,
marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a
regularly kept record of a religious organization. '256 The interpretation of
the scope of this exception, such as an interpretation of the phrase "similar
facts of personal or family history' 257 is a question of law reviewed de
novo.
258
The twelfth unrestricted exception is that for
Statements of fact contained in a certificate that the maker
performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a
sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person
authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or
by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been
issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time
thereafter.259
As with the public records and vital statistics exceptions, de novo review
would be appropriate on the question whether the particular type of
individual is "authorized ... by law"260 to perform the act certified.26'
The thirteenth unrestricted exception is that for "[s]tatements of fact
concerning personal or family history contained in family Bibles,
253. E.g., United States v. Shaffer, No. 92-30016, 1993 WL 12494, at * 2 (9th Cir. Jan.
22, 1993).
254. FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
255. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Palomares-
Munoz, No. 00-50216, 2001 WL 219951, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2001) (using phrase "abuse
its discretion").
256. FED. R. EvID. 803(11).
257. Id.
258. E.g., Ruberto v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 774 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1985);
Hall v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 729 F.2d 632, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1984).
259. FED. R. EVID. 803(12).
260. Id.
261. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits,
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. '262  Since the
Advisory Committee notes to this exception cross-reference the definition
of "personal or family history" used in the exception for records of
religious organizations,263 the interpretation of the scope of that phrase here
should likewise be reviewed de novo.26' For similar reasons, what qualifies
as a "like"2 65 family record would involve an interpretation of the text of
the exception subject to de novo review.266
The fourteenth unrestricted exception is that for
The record of a document purporting to establish or affect an
interest in property, as proof of the content of the original
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person
by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a
record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the
recording of documents of that kind in that office.267
The interpretation of the scope of this exception is de novo, such as the
determination whether it includes "judgments" that fix property rights268 or
the determination whether it would allow for the admission of "testimony"
as to the contents of such a document (as opposed to just a copy of the
document itself).269  The determination whether "an applicable statute
authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office 270 is a
question of law reviewable de novo.271
The fifteenth unrestricted exception is that for
A statement contained in a document purporting to establish or
affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to
the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property
262. FED. R. EVID. 803(13).
263. FED. R. EVID. 803(13) advisory committee's note (1974) ("The Committee
approved this Rule in the form submitted by the Court, intending that the phrase 'Statements
of fact concerning personal or family history' be read to include the specific types of such
statements enumerated in Rule 803(11).").
264. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
265. FED. R. EVID. 803(13).
266. Cf Lemay v. Dubois, No. CV-95-11912, 1996 WL 463680, at *6 (D. Mass. July
29, 1996) (raising but not deciding whether a letter from one's aunt qualifies as a family
record).
267. FED. R. EVID. 803(14).
268. Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1567 (7th Cir. 1987).
269. United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 357 (2d Cir. 1978).
270. FED. R. EVID. 803(14).
271. See FED. R. EVID. 803(14) advisory committee's note (Proposed Rule 1972)
("[W]hat may appear in the rule, at first glance, as endowing the record with an effect
independently of local law and inviting difficulties of an Erie nature... is not present, since
the local law in fact governs under the example .... ).
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since the document was made have been inconsistent with the
truth of the statement or the purport of the document.272
The prerequisites to invoking this exception are findings "that the
document is authenticated and trustworthy, that it affects an interest in
property, and that the dealings with the property since the document was
made have been consistent with the truth of the statement."273 Such factual
findings by the trial court are reviewed deferentially on appeal.274
The sixteenth unrestricted exception is that for "[s]tatements in a
document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is
established. ' 275  A special provision provides for establishing the
authenticity of such a document by showing that it "(A) is in such condition
as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place
where it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20
years or more at the time it is offered.- 276 On appeal, the factual findings in
establishing the prerequisites under the special provision for authentication
are reviewed deferentially. 277 However, the interpretation of the scope of
the hearsay exception is reviewed de novo,278 such as the question whether
the word "documents" includes electronic documents. 279
The seventeenth unrestricted exception is that for "[m]arket
quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations,
generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular
occupations. 280  The finding that the document is "generally used and
relied upon' 28' is a factual finding reviewed deferentially on appeal.282
The eighteenth unrestricted exception is that for "learned treatises,"
which under certain circumstances involving testimony by expert witnesses
provides an exception for "statements contained in published treatises,
periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science
or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of
272. FED. R. EvID. 803(15).
273. Silverstein v. Chase, 260 F.3d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2001).
274. Silverstein v. Chase, No. 02-7863, 2003 WL 1611396, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 28,
2003).
275. FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
276. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(8).
277. Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha Corp., 228 F.3d 648, 661 (6th Cir.
2000); United States v. Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1996).
278. Kalamazoo River, 228 F.3d at 661.
279. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 164, § 8.58, at 885-86.
280. FED. R. EVID. 803(17).
281. Id.
282. United States v. Meo, No. 92-10197, 1994 WL 12340, at *6-7 (9th Cir. Jan. 18,
1994); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1018-19 (1st Cir. 1993).
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the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice."283 The
factual finding by the trial court establishing the prerequisite for invoking
the exception, to wit, that it is a reliable authority, is reviewed
deferentially.284 Yet the interpretation of the scope of the rule is de novo,
such as the determination whether a videotape2 85 or the prior inconsistent
testimony of another expert in another trial286 can qualify as a
"treatise[]. 287 The exception ends with a proviso that "[i]f admitted, the
statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as
exhibits. '288  The question whether charts and diagrams are implicitly
excluded from the proviso (on the ground that reading them into evidence
would be a daunting task) is properly viewed as a question of law subject to
de novo review.28
9
The nineteenth unrestricted exception is that for "[r]eputation among
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family
history. '29° This rule has been interpreted as requiring that a foundation be
established that the witness is "familiar with the 'community' in which the
reputation has been formed, and that the basis of the reputation is one that
is likely to be reliable, 291 a finding reviewed deferentially on appeal.292
Yet the construction of the rule is reviewed de novo, such as an
interpretation of the word "community 293 as including the person's place
of work,294 or an interpretation of what qualifies as "personal or family
history. 295
The twentieth unrestricted exception is that for "[r]eputation in a
community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs
283. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
284. Costantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2000); Grossheim v.
Freightliner Corp., 974 F.2d 745, 754 (6th Cir. 1992).
285. Costantino, 203 F.3d at 170-71.
286. United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir. 1983).
287. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
288. Id.
289. United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 1978).
290. FED. R. EvID. 803(19).
291. Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 101 (3d Cir. 1999).
292. United States v. Lyons Capital, Inc., Nos. 99-4178, 99-4193, 99-4179, 99-4180,
2000 WL 1792985, at *6-7 (4th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000).
293. FED. R. EVID. 803(19).
294. Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 99.
295. E.g., United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999) (place of
birth); Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 765 F.2d 394, 398 n.5 (3d Cir. 1985) (date of birth); cf
supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community or State or nation in which located." '296
The trial court's factual findings in determining whether the foundational
prerequisites for invoking this exception are reviewed deferentially, such as
the finding that an event is one of "general history important to the
community .... "297
The twenty-first unrestricted exception is that for "[r]eputation of a
person's character among associates or in the community."'2 98 Cross-
reference should be made here to Rule 405(a), as this rule merely states that
evidence admissible under that rule is not excluded by the hearsay rule,2 99
and so the focus on appeal is on review of the application of Rule 405(a),
discussed above.
300
The twenty-second unrestricted exception is that for
Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea
of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a
person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the
judgment, but not including, when offered by the Government in
a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment,
judgments against persons other than the accused. 30 1
The interpretation of the text of this rule is reviewed de novo, such as
whether the word "judgment'30 2 includes foreign judgments,0 3 or whether
the exception is applicable if the evidence is offered for a reason other than
to prove a fact essential to sustain the judgment,30 4 or whether the exception
implicitly bars judgments not mentioned in it from being admitted pursuant
to some other exception to the hearsay rule or for a non-hearsay purpose. 05
The final unrestricted hearsay exception is that for "[j]udgments as
proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries,
essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of
296. FED. R. EVID. 803(20).
297. Id.; Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Graham, 54 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 1995).
298. FED. R. EvID. 803(21).
299. FED. R. EVID. 803(21) advisory committee's note (Proposed Rule 1972); FED. R.
EvID. 405(a).
300. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
301. FED. R. EvID. 803(22). The exception continues: "The pendency of an appeal may
be shown but does not affect admissibility." Id.
302. FED. R. EvID. 803(22).
303. Lloyd v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1190 (3d Cir. 1978).
304. United States v. Breitkreutz, 977 F.2d 214, 221 (6th Cir. 1992).
305. Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 58, 62-63 (1st Cir. 1999); Hancock v. Dodson,
958 F.2d 1367, 1371-72 (6th Cir. 1992).
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reputation."3 6 The interpretation of the text of the exception is reviewed
de novo, such as the determination that it implicitly bars the use of other
hearsay exceptions to admit judgments that do not fit within this exception
or the previous one.
30 7
Rule 804(b) sets forth a list of five restricted exceptions to the hearsay
rule, which apply only if the declarant is "unavailable" to testify as a
witness. 3 8 The definition of "'[u]navailability as a witness"' is set forth in
Rule 804(a), which provides that the phrase
[I]ncludes situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of
the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the
declarant's statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the
case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4),
the declarant's attendance or testimony) by process or other
reasonable means. 30 9
Because Rule 804(a) provides a foundational prerequisite to invoking
any of the Rule 804(b) restricted exceptions, whenever any of those
exceptions are invoked, the question arises by what standard should an
appellate court review a determination by the trial court that a declarant is
"unavailable" within the meaning of Rule 804(a)? As a general rule,
interpretations of what satisfies the definition of "unavailability" are
reviewed de novo, while findings of fact made in the course of applying the
definition reviewed deferentially. Thus, the question whether 804(a)(1)
applies to the privilege against self-incrimination is a question of law
reviewed de novo on appeal."' The finding by a trial court that a witness
refuses to testify under 804(a)(2) despite a court order to do so is reviewed
306. FED. R. EvID. 803(23).
307. Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1189-93 (10th Cir. 2002).
308. FED. R. EVID. 804(b).
309. FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
310. United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Young Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 690 (5th Cir. 1984).
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deferentially on appeal,3 ' but if the trial court fails to comply with the
requirements of 804(a)(2), such as invoking it without having first ordered
the person to testify, that is an error of law reviewed under the de novo
prong of the "abuse of discretion" standard.31 2 Reviewed deferentially on
appeal as factual findings are the determinations by the trial court that the
declarant suffers from a lack of memory under Rule 804(a)(3),3 13 that the
declarant is unable to testify due to physical or mental illness under Rule
804(a)(4),314 and the determination under Rule 804(a)(5) that the proponent
"has been unable to procure [a declarant's] attendance... by process or
other reasonable means."
315
At the end of the definition of "unavailability" is a proviso that "[a]
declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack
of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing
of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness
from attending or testifying."3" 6 The finding under this proviso that the
declarant's inability to testify is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of
the proponent of the statement is a factual finding reviewed deferentially.31 7
However, the interpretation of the phrase "procurement or wrongdoing" is
reviewed de novo, such as an interpretation of it as including the
government's decision not to confer immunity on a witness,318 or as
preventing a party who claims the Fifth Amendment privilege from
bringing in his own hearsay statements under any of the restricted hearsay
311. Wildermuth v. Michelin N. Am. Inc., Nos. 98-1232, 98-1322, 1999 WL 623465,
at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999) (abuse of discretion); United States v. Vallejo, No. 91-50670,
1992 WL 224243, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 1992) (same); United States v. Miller, No. 87-
1126, 1988 WL 76090, at *3 (6th Cir. July 18, 1988) (clear error).
312. Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980); see generally United States v. Faison, 679 F.2d
292, 295 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that abuse of discretion review "involves mixed
questions of law and of fact. As to the factual findings, the appropriate standard for review
is the clearly erroneous test.").
313. Wildermuth, 1999 WL 623465, at *4 (abuse of discretion); Miller, 1988 WL
76090, at *3 (clear error); United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1976)
(abuse of discretion).
314. United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (abuse of
discretion); United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); United
States v. Donaldson, 978 F.2d 381, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Parrott v. Wilson, 707
F.2d 1262, 1268-69 (11 th Cir. 1983) (same).
315. United States v. Olafson, 213 F.3d 435, 441-42 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (abuse of
discretion); United States v. Lopez-Garcia, No. 98-2252, 1999 WL 707783, at *3 (10th Cir.
Aug. 18, 1999) (same); United States v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 919, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1997)
(same).
316. FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
317. United States v. Pizarro, 756 F.2d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 1985) (abuse of discretion).
318. United States v. Dolah, 245 F.3d 98, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2001).
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exceptions. 319
The first restricted hearsay exception is that for
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or
proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination. 320
The interpretation of the text of the rule, such as an interpretation of the
word "hearing" as including grand jury proceedings, is a question of law
reviewed de novo. 321  Similarly, the interpretation of the word
"opportunity" as including situations in which an individual's attorney
makes a tactical decision not to exercise the opportunity is likewise a
question of law reviewed de novo.3 22 Whether there was a "similar motive
to develop the testimony 21 is often a fact-specific inquiry subject to
deferential appellate review, 324 although with respect to particular types of
prior proceedings, appellate courts sometimes hold as a matter of law that a
similar motive does or does not exist to develop testimony.
325
The second restricted exception is for "a prosecution for homicide or
in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while
believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. 326
The finding by the trial court that the statement was made while the
declarant believed that her death was imminent is reviewed deferentially,327
however as guidance, an appellate court may set forth the parameters for
exercising such discretion, such as by indicating that the rule does not
require that the victim "make an explicit statement that he or she believes
319. United States v. Kimball, 15 F.3d 54, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that it is
applying "abuse of discretion" review but seemingly reviewing de novo); United States v.
Cucci, Nos. 92-5533, 92-5534, 1993 WL 343175, at *5 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1993).
320. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
321. United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 522 (1st Cir. 1997).
322. United States v. Quincy, No. 86-5286, 1988 WL 79237, at *3 (9th Cir. July 26,
1988) (describing it as an "abuse of discretion").
323. FED R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
324. E.g., United States v. Bartelho, 129 F.3d 663, 671-72 (1st Cir. 1997).
325. United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 954-56 (6th Cir. 1997) (government has
same motive to develop testimony in grand jury proceeding as it does at trial); United States
v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same).
326. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2).
327. United States v. Taylor, 59 Fed. Appx. 960, 962-64 (9th Cir. 2003) (abuse of
discretion).
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death is imminent" but that this state of mind may instead be determined
from the nature and extent of the wounds.
328
The third restricted hearsay exception is for
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true.
3 29
The determination by the trial court that the statement was against the
declarant's interest is reviewed deferentially on appeal by some courts330
and de novo by others.331 It would seem as though the question whether
the statement "tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability"
or "to render invalid a claim by the declarant" are properly viewed as
questions of law reviewable de novo,332 while the question whether the
statement was for some non-legal reason against the person's interest
would be a factual determination reviewed deferentially. The exception
has a proviso that "[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement. '333  The finding of trustworthiness is uniformly reviewed
deferentially on appeal,334 but an error in interpreting the proviso is
reviewed de novo, such as a misinterpretation of it as requiring that there
be corroboration of the content of the statement (as opposed to mere
corroboration that the statement was made),335 or a misinterpretation of the
proviso as applying only in criminal cases. 336
The fourth restricted hearsay exception is for statements of personal or
family history, which applies to:
(A) A statement concerning the declarant's own birth, adoption,
marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or
328. Id. at 963.
329. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
330. United States v. Alvarez, 266 F.3d 587, 592-93 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463, 473 (9th Cir. 1983).
331. United States v. Costa, 31 F.3d 1073, 1077 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
332. Cf supra notes 245-247 and accompanying text.
333. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
334. Am. Auto. Accessories, Inc. v. Fishman, 175 F.3d 534, 541 (7th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Briscoe, 742 F.2d
842, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1984); Rhodes, 713 F.2d at 473.
335. Price, 134 F.3d at 347-48.
336. Am. Automotive Accessories, Inc., 175 F.3d at 541.
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marriage, ancestry or other similar fact of personal or family
history, even though declarant had no means of acquiring
personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement
concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another
person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood,
adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information
concerning the matter declared.3 37
The interpretation of the text of the rule is reviewed de novo, such as the
determination whether alienage or citizenship is a fact of personal or family
history,338 or the interpretation of the word "fact" as limiting the scope of
the rule to, say, the date of a marriage and not the motive or purpose for
getting married.33 9
The fifth restricted hearsay exception is that for "[a] statement offered
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
witness. 3 40 The factual findings by the trial court that these prerequisites
are satisfied is reviewed deferentially.34' However, the interpretation of the
text of the rule, such as what is meant by the word "wrongdoing," is
reviewed de novo.
3 42
Rule 807, the catchall exception, provides that
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is
not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A)
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. 343
337. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4).
338. Olafson, 213 F.3d at 441; United States v. Castillo-Reyes, No. 98-50058, 1998
WL 789417, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1998).
339. United States v. Carvalho, 742 F.2d 146, 151 (4th Cir. 1984).
340. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
341. United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Price,
265 F.3d 1097, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2001).
342. Scott, 284 F.3d at 763-64 (implicit de novo review).
343. FED. R. EVID. 807. The rule continues:
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
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The trial court's findings in applying the rule are reviewed deferentially on
appeal.3 " However, the interpretation of the text of the rule is reviewed de
novo,345 such as an interpretation of the phrase "not specifically covered"
346
as requiring that the residual exception not be used for hearsay that is close
to, but does not fit precisely into, a recognized hearsay exception,34 7 or an
interpretation of the exception as containing a per se bar on certain types of
evidence being admitted under it.
348
Two other rules are found in the hearsay article of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The first is Rule 805, which provides that "[h]earsay included
within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule
provided in these rules. '349 The interpretation of this rule is reviewed de
novo, such as interpreting "exception to the hearsay rule" 350 as including
statements defined as "not hearsay" by Rule 801(d).35" ' However, the
application of it to particular hearsay exceptions is governed by the same
standards of review that govern review of evidence admitted or excluded
under those exceptions.
The other rule is Rule 806, which provides that
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule
801 (d)(2)(C), (D), or (E) has been admitted in evidence, the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may
be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for
those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness.352
meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
Id.
344. See Sours v. Glanz, No. 01-5026, 2001 WL 1531204, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 4,
2001); United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11 th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Tellechia, No. 97-1984, 1998 WL 476760, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 1998); United States v.
Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1046 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097,
1106 (7th Cir. 1997); Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., 922 F.2d 272, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1991).
345. Sposito, 106 F.3d at 1046.
346. FED. R. EVID. 807.
347. United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1993).
348. Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 224, 230-40 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying
abuse of discretion review but stating that "[e]ither an error of law or a clear error of fact
may constitute an abuse of discretion.").
349. FED. R. EvID. 805.
350. Id.
351. United States v. Dotson, 821 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (not
stating a standard of review but clearly applying de novo review); United States v. Lang,
589 F.2d 92, 99 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978) (same).
352. FED. R. EviD. 806. The rule continues:
Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with
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Interpretations of the rule are reviewed de novo, such as an interpretation of
the rule as implicitly creating an exception to Rule 608(b),35 3 or an
interpretation of the rule as not applying when a statement has been offered
for a non-hearsay purpose.154 Rule 806 does not mandate that evidence that
fits the rule is necessarily admissible to impeach, however, and the decision
whether to admit such evidence is an exercise of discretion reviewed
deferentially. 355
In criminal cases, claims that evidence is inadmissible hearsay often
overlap with claims that admission of the evidence would violate the
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights, as both the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause were designed to protect similar values.356 However,
although the two claims overlap, they are not identical: admission of
evidence may violate the Confrontation Clause but not the hearsay rule,
and vice-versa. 357  Because claims that the admission of a hearsay
statement violated a criminal defendant's Confrontation Clause rights are
reviewed de novo,35 8 a party facing an uphill battle in challenging the
admission of evidence under the hearsay rule based on a deferential
standard of review might be able to increase his chances of having the
decision overturned by characterizing it as a Confrontation Clause claim.
Indeed, such re-characterization may well bear fruit given that the Supreme
Court has recently cast doubt on the constitutionality of admitting various
types of hearsay statements against the accused in criminal cases by
redefining the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and
exceptions to the hearsay rule.359 However, care must be taken to
specifically raise both the hearsay and Confrontation Clause claims, as
the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party
against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a
witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under
cross-examination.
Id.
353. United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2000).
354. United States v. McNair, Nos. 01-1626, 01-1635, 2002 WL 31060479, at *1 (2d
Cir. Sept. 17, 2002) (stating that its review is for abuse of discretion, but then applying what
appears to be de novo review); United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1997).
355. United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1988). Moreover, such
evidence remains subject to exclusion under other rules of evidence. E.g., United States v.
Rosario, 111 F.3d 293, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. EvID. 410).
356. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
357. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
358. United States v. Orellana-Blanco, 294 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 626 (7th Cir. 2001).
359. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
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raising one does not preserve the other.360
III. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
The so-called best evidence rule is set forth in Rule 1002, and
provides that "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph,
the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as
otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress."3 61  Whether
evidence is offered "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph"3 62 or for some other purpose, like the question of whether
evidence is offered for a hearsay or non-hearsay purpose, is a question of
law subject to de novo review.363 The definitions of the terms '[w]ritings'
and 'recordings, '3 64 "[p]hotographs, '365 and "original,' 366 are set forth in
Rule 1001. Whether something satisfies the definitions of the words
"writings," "recordings," or "photographs" is a question of law reviewed de
novo. 67  Likewise, the definition of the word "original" is a question of
law reviewed de novo on appeal.3 6
360. E.g., Scott, 284 F.3d at 762.
361. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
362. Id. (emphasis added).
363. Jackson v. Crews, 873 F.2d 1105, 1110 (8th Cir. 1989) (not stating standard of
review); R & R Assocs. v. Visual Scene, Inc., 726 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1984) (same).
364. FED. R. EvID. 1001(1) ("'Writings' and 'recordings' consist of letters, words, or
numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating,
photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation.").
365. FED. R. EvID. 1001(2) ("'Photographs' include still photographs, X-ray films,
video tapes, and motion pictures.").
366. FED. R. EvID. 1001(3). Rule 1001(3) states:
An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or recording itself or any
counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it.
An "original" of a photograph includes the negative of any print therefrom. If data
are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable
by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original."
Id.
367. Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1986). However, as a
matter of law an object bearing a mark is deemed to be both a chattel and a writing, and trial
courts are reviewed only for abuse of discretion in deciding whether to treat such an object
as a writing or not for purposes of applying the best evidence rule. United States v. Yamin,
868 F.2d 130, 134 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Duffy, 454 F.2d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 1972)
(citing 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1182, (3d ed. 1940);
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 199, at 411-12 (1954)).
368. See United States v. Anderson, Nos. 88-1469, 88-1510, 1990 WL 14634, at *4
(6th Cir. Feb. 20, 1990) (forged receipt made using a photocopier was an "original"
although produced with a photocopier); United States. v. Rangel, 585 F.2d 344, 346 (8th
Cir. 1978) (same, and also holding that a carbon copy of a credit card receipt is an
"original").
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Rule 1003 provides that "[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent
as an original, unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity
of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the
duplicate in lieu of the original. '369  The definition of the term
"duplicate"3 70 is set forth in Rule 1001, and its interpretation is a question
of law reviewed de novo.371' However, appellate courts review deferentially
the trial court's decision not to admit a duplicate because "'a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original' ' 372 or because in the
circumstances it would be "unfair. 373
Rule 1004 provides that
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of
a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if-
(1)... All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the
proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or
(2)... No original can be obtained by any available judicial
process or procedure; or
(3)... At a time when an original was under the control of the
party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the
pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a subject of
proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce the original
at the hearing; or
(4)... The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely
related to a controlling issue.374
The interpretation of the text of this rule is a question of law reviewed de
novo, such as a determination that, once one of the conditions apply, there
are no degrees of preference among different types of secondary evidence,
369. FED. R. EVID. 1003.
370. FED. R. EvID. 1001(4) ("A 'duplicate' is a counterpart produced by the same
impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including
enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent technique which accurately reproduces the original.").
371. See United States v. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d 983, 989-90 (1st Cir. 1997)
(microform copy of a check is a duplicate); United States v. Stockton, 968 F.2d 715, 719
(8th Cir. 1992) (photograph of a writing is a duplicate); United States v. Perry, 925 F.2d
1077, 1082 (8th Cir. 1991) (photographic image of a videotape recording is a duplicate);
United States v. Carroll, 860 F.2d 500, 507 (1st Cir. 1988) (print of a microfilm copy of a
check is a "duplicate").
372. Pahl v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 150 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 1003); Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d at 989-90 (quoting FED. R. EVID.
1003).
373. Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1391 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing
FED. R. EvID. 1003).
374. FED. R. EvID. 1004.
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and that any secondary evidence can be admitted to prove the point.375
However, the findings that the trial court must make as prerequisites to
Rule 1004's application are usually factual findings subject to review only
for clear error, such as the finding by the trial court under Rule 1004(1) that
the documents were lost or destroyed and whether the same occurred in bad
faith,3 76 as well as the finding that no original can be obtained by available
process or procedure.3 77  Whether something is "collateral" or not is
difficult to define with much precision, and thus is a determination within
the trial court's discretion.378
Rule 1005 provides that
The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to
be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed, including data
compilations in any form, if otherwise admissible, may be proved
by copy, certified as correct in accordance with rule 902 or
testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the
original.3 7
9
An interpretation of the scope of the rule, such as what qualifies as an
"official record" within the meaning of Rule 1005, is properly viewed as a
question of law reviewed de novo. 380 Rule 1005 goes on to provide that
"[i]f a copy which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, then other evidence of the contents may
be given." 381  The determination whether reasonable diligence was
exercised sufficient to invoke the proviso is a factual finding, which should
be reviewed deferentially on appellate review. 382
Rule 1006 provides that "[t]he contents of voluminous writings,
recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in
court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation." 383
375. See United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196, 203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976).
376. Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995); Estate of Gryder v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 705 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir. 1983); Wright v. Farmers Co-Op,
681 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1982).
377. United States v. Ratliff, 623 F.2d 1293, 1296-97 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1980).
378. See FED. R. EVID. 1004(4) advisory committee's note (noting that the situations in
which this rule apply are "difficult to define with precision," suggesting, like Rule 403, that
it is a matter of balancing for the trial court to conduct).
379. FED. R. EvID. 1005.
380. See Amoco Prod. Co., 619 F.2d at 1390 (original deed returned to parties after
recording is not a public record within meaning of Rule 1005).
381. FED. R. EVID. 1005.
382. Cf supra note 253 and accompanying text.
383. FED. R. EVID. 1006. The rule continues: "The originals, or duplicates, shall be
made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable time and
place. The court may order that they be produced in court." Id.
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The rule is written in permissive terms ("may"), and the trial court's
decision whether to allow the admission of summaries is reviewed only for
abuse of discretion.384 Yet a decision to exclude a summary based on an
interpretation of the rule, such as an interpretation of the rule as requiring
that the underlying documents summarized be themselves admissible into
evidence, is a question of law subject to de novo review.385
Rule 1007 provides that "[c]ontents of writings, recordings, or
photographs may be proved by the testimony or deposition of the party
against whom offered or by that party's written admission, without
accounting for the nonproduction of the original.- 386 This rule's text is so
straightforward that no appellate decisions have even discussed the rule, let
alone a standard of review. As with the other rules, to the extent a question
is raised as to the interpretation of this rule, review would be de novo.
Rule 1008 provides that:
When the admissibility of other evidence of contents of writings,
recordings, or photographs under these rules depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the question whether the
condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the court to determine
in accordance with the provisions of rule 104. However, when an
issue is raised (a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, or (b)
whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the
trial is the original, or (c) whether other evidence of contents
correctly reflects the contents, the issue is for the trier of fact to
determine as in the case of other issues of fact.3 87
The interpretation of this rule-which is merely a specialized application of
Rule 104-is a question of law reviewed de novo, such as whether a
particular issue is one that is to be decided by the judge or instead one to be
left to the jury to decide.3 88
IV. WITNESS PRIVILEGE, COMPETENCE, IMPEACHMENT, AND
EXAMINATION
Rule 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness... shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
384. E.g., Martin v. Funtime, Inc., 963 F.2d 110, 115 (6th Cir. 1992); Harris Mkt.
Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communications, Inc., 948 F.2d 1518, 1525 (10th Cir. 1991);
Fagiola v. Nat'l Gypsum Co. AC & S., Inc., 906 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1990).
385. See United States v. Johnson, 594 F.2d 1253, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1979).
386. FED. R. EVID. 1007.
387. FED. R. EvID. 1008.
388. See Seiler, 808 F.2d at 1318-21; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. '
The determination of the existence and scope of a federal evidentiary
privilege under Rule 501 is a question of law reviewed de novo,3 90 although
the application of such a recognized privilege to a particular factual
scenario is subject to deferential review. 39' Thus, for example, the
existence and scope of a federal marital confidence privilege is a question
of law subject to de novo review, but the factual determination that the
prerequisites to invoking such a privilege exist-a valid marriage and a
communication made in confidence-would be reviewed for clear error.
Rule 501 goes on to provide that, "in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law."'3 92 When the trial court construes state
privilege law in accordance with this proviso, review is de novo.393
Presumably, however, factual findings in applying state privilege law, like
those in applying federal privilege law, are reviewed deferentially. The
Senate recognized, but did not resolve, what to do in a situation in which
there was both a federal and a state law claim in the same case. 394 The
interpretation of the rule to determine what should be done in this situation
is a question of law subject to de novo review. 395
Rule 601 provides that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness
except as otherwise provided in these rules. 396 Trial courts frequently will
make a finding as to the competency of a witness, particularly where
389. FEDR.EVID. 501.
390. Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2000); Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355 (6th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Deffenbaugh Indus. Inc., 957 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Bevill, Bresler &
Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1986).
391. Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883-84 (1st Cir.
1995); In re Bevill, 805 F.2d at 124.
392. FED. R. EvID. 501.
393. Kelso v. Noble, No. 97-3568, 1998 WL 552831, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 1998);
United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 965 (3d Cir. 1988).
394. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 12 n.17 (1974) (noting that such a situation "might require
use of two bodies of privilege law," and suggesting that "[i]f the rule proposed here results
in two conflicting bodies of privilege law applying to the same piece of evidence in the
same case, it is contemplated that the rule favoring reception of the evidence should be
applied.").
395. See Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 66 (3d Cir. 2000) (not stating standard of
review but appears to be de novo); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir.
1987) (same).
396. FED. R. EVID. 601.
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questions arise as to the witness's capacity to perceive, remember,
communicate, and testify honestly, and these determinations are reviewed
deferentially on appeal.397 Rule 601 goes on to provide that, "in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a
witness shall be determined in accordance with State law." 398 When the
trial court determines the content of state law to apply this proviso, review
of this question of law is de novo.399
Rule 602 provides that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter."4'0 The trial court's determination that
evidence sufficient to support a finding of personal knowledge has been
introduced is reviewed deferentially on appeal.4 ' The trial court errs as a
matter of law, however, if it fails to require that a foundation be laid that a
witness has personal knowledge of a matter to which he is testifying.40 2
Rule 603 provides that "[b]efore testifying, every witness shall be
required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
397. United States v. Blankenship, 923 F.2d 1110, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 291-92 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Moreno, 899 F.2d
465, 469-70 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 936 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 112-13 (4th Cir. 1984); Bickford v. John E. Mitchell
Co., 595 F.2d 540, 544 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Van Meerbeke, 548 F.2d 415, 417
n.3 (2d Cir. 1976). This is perhaps more properly viewed as an application of Rule 602 and
603 than 601. Cf. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 164, § 6.2, at 421-22.
398. FED. R. EvID. 601.
399. Higgenbottom v. Noreen, 586 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding as a matter
of law that Oregon law provides trial courts with a great deal of discretion, and then
reviewing the trial court's decision in accordance with such a deferential standard).
400. FED. R. EVID. 602. The rule continues: "Evidence to prove personal knowledge
may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the
provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses." Id.
401. Stuart v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.3d 1145, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Lake, 150
F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1536 (10th Cir.
1997); McCrary-El v. Shaw, 992 F.2d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 1993); Woods v. Beavers, No. 90-
3338, 1991 WL 311, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 3 1991); United States v. Davis, 792 F.2d 1299,
1304-05 (5th Cir. 1986); M.B.A.F.B. Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 681 F.2d
930, 932-33 (4th Cir. 1982).
402. Davis, 792 F.2d at 1304-05. The court stated:
We do not suggest that the trial court has discretion either to do away with
the foundation requirement of Rule 602 or to allow testimony that is shown to be
without adequate basis in personal knowledge.... But we believe that the trial
court has some discretion in evaluating such an initial showing ....
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conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so."4 °3 The
trial court's application of this rule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
40 4
Rule 604 provides that "[a]n interpreter is subject to the provisions of
these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of
an oath or affirmation to make a true translation. 40 5  This is simply a
specialized application of Rules 702 and 603, and thus the appropriate
standard of review is that which is applied to decisions made under those
rules.40 6
Rule 605 provides that "[t]he judge presiding at the trial may not
testify in that trial as a witness. 40 7 Although the standard of review is
typically unstated, it appears to be de novo,4 °8 which makes sense given
that it would be rather odd to give deference to the trial court judge on this
issue. Because this rule does not require an objection to be made in the
trial court to preserve this error for appeal,4 9 a failure to object at trial does
not reduce the level of review to that of plain error review
t0
Rule 606 addresses limitations on the competence of jurors to
testify.41' Rule 606(a) provides that "a member of the jury may not testify
as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is
403. FED. R. EVID. 603.
404. United States v. Hawkins, 76 F.3d 545, 551 (4th Cir. 1996); Ferguson v. Comm'r
of Internal Revenue, 921 F.2d 588, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1991); Gordon v. Idaho, 778 F.2d 1397,
1400-01 (9th Cir. 1985). It is an abuse of discretion to either allow a witness to testify who
has not given an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully, or to prevent a witness from
testifying without considering an alternative to using the words "swear" or "affirm" that
would be consistent with the witness' religious beliefs. Hawkins, 76 F.3d at 551; Ferguson,
921 F.2d at 589-90; Gordon, 778 F.2d at 1400-01.
405. FED. R. EvID. 604.
406. See United States v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1999); see also supra notes
403-404 and accompanying text; infra notes 475-484 and accompanying text.
407. FED. R. EvID. 605.
408. See United States v. Maceo, 947 F.2d 1191, 1200 (5th Cir. 1991). One court has
indicated that its review is for abuse of discretion, United States v. Stine, No. 94-17129,
1995 WL 661223, at * 3 (9th Cir. Nov. 8 1995), but the gist of the holding would seem to be
that a judge who testifies as a witness at trial by definition abuses his discretion. See id.
409. See FED. R. EvID. 605 ("No objection need be made in order to preserve the
point."); see also FED. R. EVID. 605 advisory committee's note. The advisory committee's
note stated:
The rule provides an "automatic" objection. To require an actual objection
would confront the opponent with a choice between not objecting, with the result
of allowing the testimony, and objecting, with the probable result of excluding the
testimony but at the price of continuing the trial before a judge likely to feel that
his integrity had been attacked by the objector.
FED. R. EVID. 605 advisory committee's note.
410. United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 158 n.8 (1st Cir. 1989).
411. FED. R. EvID. 606.
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sitting. '4t2 Rule 606(b) further provides that
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations or the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.413
The interpretation of the rule is de novo, such as the determination
whether the rule allows the judge to ask the jurors whether an extraneous
communication or outside influence actually altered their verdict (as
opposed to just whether such a communication or influence occurred), 14
the interpretation of the phrase "extraneous prejudicial information," 415 or
the distinction between an "outside" versus an "internal" influence.41 6 As
with many other rules of evidence, the courts use the phrase "abuse of
discretion" to describe the standard of review, but in context it is clear that
they are applying the de novo prong of the "abuse of discretion"
standard.4" 7
Rule 607 provides that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party, including the party calling the witness., 418 The trial court
nonetheless has discretion under Rule 403 to exclude such impeachment
when it appears to be done as a mere subterfuge to get inadmissible
evidence before the jury, and such a call is, like all other Rule 403
determinations, reviewed for abuse of discretion.419
412. FED. R. EvID. 606(a). The rule continues: "If the juror is called so to testify, the
opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury." Id.
413. FED. R. EvID. 606(b). The rule continues: "Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence
of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded
from testifying be received for these purposes." Id.
414. See United States v. Walls, No. 95-2373, 1998 WL 552907, at *6-7 (6th Cir. Aug.
11, 1998); Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 917-18 (7th Cir. 1991).
415. See Stewart v. Amusements of Am., No. 96-1537, 1998 WL 406868, at *3-5 (4th
Cir. July 15, 1998).
416. See United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 634-35 (6th Cir. 1998).
417. United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1015 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) ("To the extent
that the District Court used testimony barred by Rule 606(b) to make its findings of fact, the
court abused its discretion.").
418. FED. R. EvID. 607.
419. Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 189-90 (4th Cir. 1975).
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Rule 608(a) provides that
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence
or otherwise.4
20
The interpretation of the meaning of the text of this rule is reviewed de
novo.
42 1
Rule 608(b) provides that
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than
conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the
court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of
another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified.422
In accordance with the text of this rule, the trial court's decision to admit
evidence that satisfies the prerequisites of this rule is reviewed deferentially
on appeal.4 23 The interpretation of the text of the rule, such as whether a
given type of prior act is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, or
whether the rule covers conduct for which the person has not been
convicted, is a question of law reviewed de novo.424 Likewise, the question
whether another rule of evidence implicitly modifies Rule 608(b)'s scope is
a question of law reviewed de novo.4 25
Rule 609 addresses the use of prior criminal convictions to impeach a
420. FED. R. EvID. 608(a).
421. United States v. Brown, No. 93-30279, 1994 WL 587394, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 26,
1994).
422. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). The rule continues: "The giving of testimony, whether by an
accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the
witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which
relate only to credibility." Id.
423. United States v. Scott, 74 F.3d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1996).
424. See United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that it is
for abuse of discretion); United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 1188, 1193 (7th Cir. 1996) (not
stating that it is de novo).
425. United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2000).
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witness. 426 Rule 609(a) provides that
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the
crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless
of the punishment.427
The balancing under Rule 609(a)(1), like Rule 403 balancing, is reviewed
deferentially on appeal.4 2' The interpretation of the text of the rule is de
novo, such as the determination that a crime qualifies as one that "involved
dishonesty or false statement,''429 or an interpretation of Rule 609(a)(2) as
not allowing the trial court any discretion under Rule 403 to exclude such
evidence.43°
Rule 609(b) provides that
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the
conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement
imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the
court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative
value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.431
The application of this rule is reviewed deferentially on appeal,432 but the
426. FED. R. EvID. 609.
427. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
428. United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Jimenez, 214 F.3d 1095, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2000).
429. Walden v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 522-23 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Rattigan, No. 92-3597, 1993 WL 190910, at *4 (6th Cir. June 2, 1993); Dean v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 924 F.2d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1991).
430. SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2000).
431. FED. R. EvID. 609(b). The rule continues:
However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is
not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
Id.
432. United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999).
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interpretation of the text of the rule is de novo, such as the determination of
the appropriate end date for calculating the ten-year period (i.e., date of
indictment versus date trial begins versus date witness testifies).43 3
Rule 609(c) provides that
Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1)
the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment,
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that
person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2)
the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or
other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.434
The determination whether a particular state procedure qualifies as an
"equivalent procedure" is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. 35
Rule 609(d) provides that
Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible
under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack
the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission
in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of
guilt or innocence.436
The decision to admit a juvenile adjudication based on a finding that it is
"necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence 437 is
reviewed deferentially on appeal.438
Rule 610 provides that "[e]vidence of the beliefs or opinions of a
witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing
that by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or
enhanced. 43 9 However, inquiry into religious beliefs "for the purpose of
showing interest or bias because of them" is not barred by Rule 610.40
The interpretation of the scope of the rule is de novo, such as the
determination whether evidence is probative of bias and thus not subject to
433. United States v. Lorenzo, 43 F.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 1995).
434. FED. R. EvID. 609(c).
435. United States v. Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1055 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1991); see also
Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159, 171 (8th Cir. 1989) (no discretion on trial court's part to
second-guess a determination of rehabilitation made by the governor in a pardon).
436. FED. R. EvID. 609(d).
437. Id.
438. United States v. Williams, 963 F.2d 1337, 1341 (10th Cir. 1992).
439. FED. R. EvID. 610.
440. FED. R. EvID. 610 advisory committee's note.
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automatic exclusion under the rule."'
Rule 611(a) provides that "[t]he court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for
the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."-442  The
application of this rule is reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal,
including the decisions by the trial court to allow rebuttal or surrebuttal
testimony," 3 to allow testimony in narrative form instead of in response to
specific questions,'" and to control the method of interrogating
witnesses. 445
Rule 611 (b) provides that "[c]ross-examination should be limited to
the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the
credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion,
permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination." 446 As
the text of this rule suggests, the trial court's application of this rule is
reviewed deferentially on appeal. 47 However, where the limitations placed
on a criminal defendant's ability to cross-examine a witness are extremely
severe, it may be possible to make out a Confrontation Clause claim, which
would be reviewed de novo.448
Rule 611 (c) provides that
Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination
of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness'
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on
cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an
adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party,
441. See Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thien, 63 F.3d 754, 760-61 (8th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Kalaydjian,
784 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1986).
442. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
443. United States v. Mitan, 966 F.2d 1165, 1176 (7th Cir. 1992).
444. United States v. Pless, 982 F.2d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1992).
445. United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1998).
446. FED. R. EvID. 611(b).
447. United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1999); Losacco v. F.D.
Rich Constr. Co., Inc., 992 F.2d 382, 385 (1st Cir. 1993); F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen
Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1257 (2d Cir. 1987). Indeed, Rule 611(b) determinations
are virtually unreviewable. See United States v. Carter, 910 F.2d 1524, 1530 (7th Cir. 1990)
("The effect is to confine the matter largely to the trial level and to remove it from the area
of profitable appellate review." (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 24, at 56 n.6 (Edward
W. Cleary et al. eds., 3d ed. 1984))).
448. See United States v. Adamson, 291 F.3d 606, 612 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999). Cf supra notes 356-360 and accompanying
text.
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interrogation may be by leading questions.449
The decision by the trial court to allow the use of leading questions in any
situation is reviewed for abuse of discretion.450
Rule 612 provides that, except in certain criminal cases,
[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of
testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the
hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to
introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony
of the witness.45
The trial court's determination whether "it is necessary in the interests of
justice" to require disclosure is reviewed deferentially on appeal. 52
However, if framed as a question whether Rule 612 acts to override
existing privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, that is a question
of law properly reviewed de novo.453
Rule 613(a) provides that "[i]n examining a witness concerning a
prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the statement
need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but
on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. 454
Rule 613(b) provides that "[e]xstrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded
an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice
otherwise require. ' 455 The interpretation of what it means for a witness to
be "afforded an opportunity to explain or deny" is a question of law subject
to de novo review,456 but there is deferential review of the trial court's
449. FED. R. EVID. 611(c).
450. United States v. Stelivan, 125 F.3d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1995); Morvant v. Constr. Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626,
635 (6th Cir. 1978).
451. FED. R. EVID. 612.
452. Bums v. Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1998); McKenzie v.
McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1420-21 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Wong, 886 F.2d 252,
257 (9th Cir. 1989).
453. Cf Suss v. MSX Int'l Eng'g Serv., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 159, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
454. FED. R. EvID. 613(a).
455. FED. R. EvID. 613(b). The rule continues: "This provision does not apply to
admissions of a party-opponent as defined in rule 801 (d)(2)." Id.
456. See United States v. McLaughlin, 663 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1981).
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determination that the statements are inconsistent457 and its application of
Rule 613(b).458
Rule 614 provides that "[t]he court may, on its own motion or at the
suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-
examine witnesses thus called" and that "[t]he court may interrogate
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party., 459 The questioning by
judges pursuant to Rule 614 is reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion.460
Rule 615 provides that, subject to certain exceptions, "[a]t the request
of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear
the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own
motion."'4 6' The interpretation of the text of the rule, such as the meaning
of the word "witnesses," is a question of law reviewed de novo.4 62 Rule
615 goes on to provide that it
[D]oes not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural
person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a
natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or
(3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to
the presentation of the party's cause, or (4) a person authorized by
statute to be present.463
The finding that a person is "essential to the presentation of the
party's cause" is reviewed deferentially on appeal,4' as is the finding as to
who is a party, officer, or employee.465 Presumably, whether someone is
"authorized by statute to be present" is a question of law reviewable de
novo on appeal. The trial court's exclusion of someone that it has found
falls within an exception is an error of law reviewed de novo,466 as is its
457. United States v. Hoffman, No. 95-3445, 1995 WL 465799, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 4,
1995); United States v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 874-75 (2d Cir. 1995).
458. United States v. Speece, Nos. 92-3077, 92-3078, 1993 WL 17105, at *4 (10th Cir.
Jan. 26, 1993); United States v. McCoy, Nos. 89-5658, 89-5660, 90-7351, 90-7352, 90-
7356, 1991 WL 179063, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1991).
459. FED. R. EVID. 614.
460. Stevenson v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 248 F.3d 1187, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530, 536 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Martin, 189
F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1485-86 (10th Cir.
1996).
461. FED. R. EVID. 615.
462. United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2000).
463. FED. R. EVID. 615.
464. United States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002); Bruneau v. S.
Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 762 (2d Cir. 1998); Opus 3 Ltd. v. Heritage Park,
Inc., 91 F.3d 625, 628-29 (4th Cir. 1996).
465. Seschillie, 310 F.3d at 1213; Opus 3 Ltd., 91 F.3d at 628-29.
466. Opus 3 Ltd., 91 F.3d at 628-29.
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failure to exclude a witness upon request when no exception has been
invoked.467
Rule 701 provides that
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions
or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of
the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c)
not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702.468
As with so many of the rules of evidence, most appellate decisions indicate
in broad terms that the decision to admit lay witness testimony under Rule
701 is committed to the trial court's discretion.469  However, the
subsections of the rule should be examined separately. Rule 701(a) is
merely a restatement of Rule 602,470 and thus should be reviewed under the
same deferential standard set forth for reviewing Rule 602. 47 1 By contrast,
appellate courts appear to review de novo whether testimony will be
"helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue" within the meaning of Rule 701(b),47 2
deciding as a matter of law that certain types of testimony are helpful or
unhelpful, but leaving the decision to admit evidence deemed "helpful" to
the trial court's discretion. 473 An interpretation of the scope of this rule,
such as interpreting its helpfulness requirement as still applying to evidence
467. Seschillie, 310 F.3d at 1213 n.3; Opus 3 Ltd., 91 F.3d at 628-29; United States v.
Royster, No. 94-5625, 1995 WL 447995, at *3 (4th Cir. July 31, 1995).
468. FED. R. EVID. 701.
469. E.g., United States v. Tom, 330 F.3d 83, 94 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.
Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 434 (2d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1983).
470. See FED. R. EvID. 701 advisory committee's note ("Limitation (a) is the familiar
requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation."); United States v. Dotson, 799 F.2d
189, 192 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1986); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l., Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403 (3d
Cir. 1980).
471. See supra text accompanying notes 400-402.
472. FED. R. EvID. 701(b).
473. See Hester v. BIC Corp., 225 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000) (witness' testimony as
to defendant's motivation in employment discrimination case not helpful); Gust v. Jones,
162 F.3d 587, 595 (10th Cir. 1998) (lay testimony about vehicle driving speed helpful);
Anderskow, 88 F.3d at 250-51 (witness' testimony that defendant "had to know" a particular
fact not helpful); United States v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1995) ("opinion
testimony identifying defendant from surveillance photographs" is helpful); United States v.
Burgess, Nos. 90-6187, 90-6329, 90-6346, 1992 WL 393575, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1992)
(testimony that in police officer's opinion, individual was a co-conspirator not helpful);
United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1988) (interpretation of coded
conversations helpful, but interpretation of clear conversation not helpful).
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not excluded by Rule 704, is likewise a question of law reviewed de
novo.
474
Rule 702 provides that
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.475
Rule 702 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as containing a
reliability standard. 76 Of course, any such interpretation of the rule itself is
a question of law reviewed de novo,477 however, the trial court's
application of that reliability standard is reviewed only for abuse of
discretion,478 including how it chooses to go about determining reliability
(including, for example, the decision whether or not to hold a hearing). 479
Some appellate decisions indicate that they review de novo whether the
district court applied the Daubert framework, reasoning that the trial court
has discretion on how to conduct its gatekeeping function, but no discretion
not to perform it at all,48 ° but in effect this is simply saying that it is an
abuse of discretion not to apply Daubert at all. The finding by the trial
court that a particular witness is "qualified" to be a witness based on his
education and experience is reviewed deferentially on appeal.4 1  And
although appellate decisions state that they review the determination that
evidence will "assist" the trier of fact deferentially on appeal,482 they
sometimes appear to hold as a matter of law that certain categories of
474. See Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1985).
475. FED. R. EVID. 702.
476. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
477. Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000).
478. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
479. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 153.
480. See Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003); Chapman v.
Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2002).
481. United States v. Lysaith, 49 Fed. Appx. 407, 409 (4th Cir. 2002) (abuse of
discretion); Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 743 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Diefenbach v.
Sheridan Transp., 229 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d
885, 889 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1151 (6th Cir. 1997)
(clear error).
482. United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2001) (abuse of
discretion); United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1514 (5th Cir. 1996) (same).
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evidence will not satisfy the requirement that they "assist" the trier of
fact,4 8 3 which is more consistent with the treatment of the analogous
"helpfulness" requirement of Rule 701.484
Rule 703 provides that
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or
inference to be admitted.485
A trial court "abuses its discretion" under the de novo prong of the "abuse
of discretion" standard when it errs in interpreting Rule 703, such as by
excluding a witness' testimony simply because it is based on facts that are
not in evidence.4 86 The determination whether facts or data are of the type
"reasonably relied" upon by experts in the field is a factual finding
reviewed deferentially on appeal.487 If a hypothetical question is to be
used, review of the trial court's rulings on the permissible form of such a
question is deferential on appeal.488 Rule 703 goes on to provide that
"[f]acts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the
jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court
determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the
expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.- 489 This
standard is a modified form of Rule 403,490 similar to the alternative
balancing tests used in Rules 412 and 609,4 1' and like those rules, calls for
deferential review of the trial court's balancing on appeal.492
Rule 704(a) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (b),
testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
483. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104-07 (7th Cir. 1999).
484. See supra notes 472-474.
485. FED. R. EvID. 703.
486. Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998); Ponder v.
Warren Tool Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1987).
487. United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (abuse of
discretion); United States v. McPhilomy, 270 F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); De
Saracho v. Custom Food Mach., Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).
488. Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1986).
489. FED. R. EVID. 703.
490. FED. R. EVID. 403.
491. See supra notes 136-137, 427-428 and accompanying text.
492. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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the trier of fact. ' 4 93 However, the advisory committee's notes make clear
that other rules-such as Rule 702's "helpfulness" requirement-are still
applicable.4 94 If the trial court nevertheless interpreted the rule as requiring
it to admit evidence on an ultimate issue notwithstanding other rules of
exclusion such as Rule 702,49' or if it continued to apply the common law
ultimate issue rule notwithstanding the plain text of Rule 704(a), that would
likely be viewed as an error of law subject to de novo review.
Rule 704(b) contains a caveat to Rule 704(a), providing that
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion
or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the
mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime
charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters
for the trier of fact alone.496
Courts indicate that they review the application of Rule 704(b) for
abuse of discretion,497 yet they seem to review de novo what the ultimate
issue is for the purpose of determining whether a Rule 704(b) violation has
occurred, 498 and also appear to hold as a matter of law that the use of
certain types of phrases or language by an expert does or does not
constitute a violation of the rule. 49 9 Moreover, the scope of the rule is a
question of law reviewed de novo, such as whether it applies only to
testimony by psychiatrists and other mental health experts, °° and whether
it applies to statements from which a jury can infer intent or only to those
which explicitly state that the person had such an intent.501
Rule 705 provides that "[t]he expert may testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any
event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
examination."50 2  The trial court's decision with respect to requiring
493. FED. R. EVID. 704(a).
494. See FED. R. EVID. 704(a) advisory committee's note.
495. See United States v. Barile, 286 F.3d 749, 759-60 (4th Cir. 2002); Chalifa v.
Mayor of Balt., No. 92-1112, 1993 WL 50514, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 1993).
496. FED. R. EvID. 704(b).
497. E.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
498. E.g., United States v. Dixon, 185 F.3d 393, 398-400 (5th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1997).
499. E.g., United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1385-89 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United
States v. Kristiansen, 901 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (8th Cir. 1990).
500. See Morales, 108 F.3d at 1035-36.
501. See id.; United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 383-84 (6th Cir. 1997).
502. FED. R. EvID. 705.
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disclosure on cross-examination is reviewed deferentially on appeal." 3
Presumably, so too would be the decision by the court to "require[]
otherwise" and thus require the expert to first testify to the underlying facts
and data.504
Rule 706(a) provides that the trial court "may" appoint an expert
witness in addition to any that may be hired by the parties, and Rule 706(c)
gives the trial court "discretion" to disclose to the jury that the expert was
appointed by the court.5°5 Given this permissive language, the trial court's
application of Rule 706 is, not surprisingly, reviewed only for abuse of
discretion on appeal.5" 6
V. EVIDENTIARY SUBSTITUTES: JUDICIAL NOTICE AND PRESUMPTIONS
Rule 201 governs the procedures for taking judicial notice,50 7 although
Rule 201(a) makes clear that the rule "governs only judicial notice of
adjudicative facts," not review of legislative or other facts.5"8 The
determination whether a given fact is "adjudicative," and thus within the
scope of Rule 201, is a question of law subject to de novo review.50 9 If a
fact is "adjudicative," Rule 201(b) provides the standard for taking judicial
notice of it, requiring that it "not [be] subject to reasonable dispute in that it
is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court, or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."5" 0 Appellate
decisions sometimes appear to hold that certain types of evidence (e.g.,
geography, statements in documents filed in other courts) satisfy or do not
satisfy the requirements of Rule 201(b) as a matter of law,5 1 although in
503. United States v. Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1984); N.V. Maatschappij
Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415,421 (2d Cir. 1978).
504. See United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 519 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting).
505. FED. R. EvID. 706(a), (c).
506. Quiet Tech, DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois U.K. Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1348-49 (1 th
Cir. 2003); Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071
(9th Cir. 1999); Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1006 (5th Cir. 1977).
507. FED. R. EvID. 201.
508. FED. R. EVID. 201(a).
509. Qualley v. Clo-Tex Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (8th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Wolny, 133 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hernandez-Fundora,
58 F.3d 802, 810-12 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 219-21 (8th Cir.
1976).
510. FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
511. E.g., United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1276-80 (1 th Cir. 1999); United States v. Chapel, 41 F.3d
1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1994); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d
1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 1992).
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general, appellate decisions hold that the determination is subject to
deferential review.512 Deferential review in the finding of facts would
appear to be appropriate, as the determination whether something is
"generally known" within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction seems to
be a fact-intensive inquiry, as does the determination whether the accuracy
of something cannot reasonably be questioned. Although many appellate
decisions use the phrase "abuse of discretion" review in this context,513
given that trial courts are textually denied "discretion" under Rule 201(d),
which provides that if a party requests judicial notice and provides the
necessary supporting information,5" 4 the court is required to take judicial
notice of that fact if it satisfies the requirements of Rule 201(b), the
application cannot truly be a matter within the trial court's discretion
beyond discretion in finding the facts necessary to apply the standard set
forth in Rule 201(b), suggesting that review here is under the clear error
prong of the "abuse of discretion" standard.
Rule 201(e) provides that "[a] party is entitled upon timely request to
an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and
the tenor of the matter noticed."5 5 The interpretation of the scope of Rule
201(e) is a question of law reviewed de novo, such as the question whether
it applies whenever any party requests such an opportunity or only when
the party opposing the taking of judicial notice requests it.516 Rule 201(f)
provides that "[j]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding," 517 while Rule 201(g) provides that "[i]n a civil action or
proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it
may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed."5" 8 The interpretation of the scope of these provisions is de novo
as well, such as a determination whether Rule 201 (g) implicitly limits Rule
201 (f)'s application in criminal cases. 19
512. York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948, 958 (10th Cir. 1996); Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
58 F.3d 454, 458-59 (9th Cir. 1995); Chapel, 41 F.3d at 1342; Transorient Navigators Co. v.
M/S Southwind, 788 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1986).
513. York, 95 F.3d at 958; Ritter, 58 F.3d at 458-59; Chapel, 41 F.3d at 1342;
Transorient Navigators, 788 F.2d at 293.
514. FED. R. EVID. 201(d) ("A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party
and supplied with the necessary information.").
515. FED. R. EvID. 201(e). The rule continues: "In the absence of prior notification, the
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken." Id.
516. Am. Stores Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (10th
Cir. 1999).
517. FED. R. EvID. 201(f).
518. FED. R. EvID. 201(g).
519. United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219, 222-24 (6th Cir. 1978).
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Rule 301 sets forth a default rule for the effect that presumptions have
in civil cases, providing that
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward
with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift
to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-
persuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast.52°
The determination whether Congress or the rules have "otherwise
provided" is a question of law reviewed de novo.52' So too is the
determination of the effect of a presumption once the opposing party has
met its burden of production under Rule 301 (i.e., whether it disappears
completely, or continues to have some residual evidentiary effect).522
Rule 302 qualifies Rule 301, providing that "[i]n civil actions and
proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law applies the rule of
decision is determined in accordance with State law."523 Appellate review
as to the existence of a state law presumption and the effect thereof, like the
similar determinations under other rules that cross-reference state law, 524 is
a question of law reviewed de novo. 25
CONCLUSION
There is a great deal of confusion amongst attorneys who litigate in
federal court as to the appropriate standard by which the federal courts of
appeal review claims of error in admitting or excluding evidence. Their
confusion is understandable, given that so many appellate decisions state
520. FED. R. EvID. 301.
521. Hood v. Knappton Corp., 986 F.2d 329, 330-32 (9th Cir. 1993) (implicitly finding
that Congress has otherwise provided); Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A. v. Cerveceria
India, Inc., 892 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
522. Nunley v. City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1995); Pennzoil Co.
v. FERC, 789 F.2d 1128, 1136-37 n.24 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Yoder Co., 758 F.2d 1114,
1118-1120 (6th Cir. 1985).
523. FED. R. EVID. 302.
524. Cf supra notes 392-393, 398-399 and accompanying text.
525. Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1996) (explicitly
stating de novo as standard of review); see also Monger v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 812 F.2d
402, 404-05 (8th Cir. 1987) (implicitly applying de novo review); Estate of Davis v.
Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1074 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Huff v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 683
F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 677 F.2d 1258, 1266-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d
810, 814-15 (4th Cir. 1982) (same).
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that review of such errors is only for "abuse of discretion," a standard
which in its classical sense is widely understood to be extremely difficult to
overcome.
Yet this Article has demonstrated that although many decisions say
that review is only for abuse of discretion, they do not actually mean it.
Ultimately, applying the federal rules of evidence involves the three
traditional categories of decision-making-law, fact, and discretion-and
ultimately, these three different categories of decision-making are
reviewed, respectively, de novo, for clear error, and for abuse of discretion.
It is the author's hope that by delineating how the tripartite standard of
review applies to each of the federal rules of evidence, practitioners will be
better prepared to argue for the correct standard of review on appeal and
that, in time, appellate decisions will state with greater clarity the true
standards by which claims of error in admitting or excluding evidence are
reviewed.
